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We analyze the relationship between the development, and asset allocation, of 
contractual savings and firms’ capital structures. We develop a simple model of firms’ 
leverage and debt maturity decision. We illustrate the mechanisms through which 
contractual savings development may affect corporate financing patterns. In the empirical 
section, we show that the development and asset allocation of contractual savings have an 
independent impact on firms’ financing choices. Different channels are identified. In 
market-based economies, an increase in the proportion of shares in the portfolio of 
contractual savings leads to a decline in firms’ leverage. In bank-based economies, 
instead, an increase in the size of contractual savings is associated with an increase in 
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The past two decades have witnessed a parallel explosion of equity markets and 
institutional investors, especially pension funds. In many stock markets, capitalization 
and liquidity have soared while institutional investors have become crucial actors in the 
capital markets of not only developed, Anglo-Saxon economies, but also in a handful of 
emerging economies (for instance Chile and South Africa). Demographic evolution, 
mainly in OECD but also in emerging economies, is bound to increase pressure on 
countries to reform their pension system, and to choose effective investment regulations 
and policies for the newly created institutions. Pension reforms, designed to guaranty a 
sufficient living standard after retirement, generate a stable source of long-term domestic 
savings. Recent studies argue that this w ill foster capital market development and 
deepening.
1 Ultimately, the array of funding possibilities for domestic firms will be 
enriched, in particular the access to long term capital. In the recent context of currency 
and financial crisis associated with asset-liability mismatch in the balance sheets of firms 
(and banks), and excess reliance on (foreign currency denominated) short-term debt,
2 it is 
becoming urgent to evaluate whether the presence of domestic institutional investors tend 
to reduce firms’ and other economic agents’ vulnerability to interest rate variations and 
other shocks. In a more general context, Caprio and Demirguc-Kunt (1997) show that the 
lack of long term finance in emerging economies is not totally explained by firms’ 
characteristics. The institutional environment and macroeconomic factors affect 
significantly the supply of long-term finance. This paper is the first known attempt to 
assess both empirically and theoretically the impact of contractual savings
3 development 
on firms’ financing decisions, in a sample of developed and emerging economies. 
 
The primary objective of a pension reform is to provide sufficient and affordable 
benefits for old age that can be sustained in the long-run. Financial deepening only 
should not motivate a pension reform. Moreover, history teaches that contractual savings 
institutions are neither sufficient nor necessary for capital market development.
4 Still, the 
issue is the  speed of financial development. Whether financial deepening takes two 
decades or two generations has very different implications in term of development 
strategies. Recent studies (see Catalan et al. (2000) and Impavido and Musalem (2000)) 
suggest, for instance, that the rapid growth of capital markets over the past 15-20 years is 
partly explained by the development of contractual savings institutions. Pension funds 
and life insurance companies
5 are becoming essential characteristics of modern financial 
systems, and as such will significantly modify the corporate sector financing choices. 
                                                 
1 See Impavido and Musalem (2000) for empirical evidence. 
2 See for instance Rodrik and Velasco (1999), and Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (2000) for a theoretical 
model of monetary policies in such a context. 
3 Contractual savings institutions include pension funds and life insurance companies. 
4  See Vittas (2000). 
5 There are of course other central players on capital markets, such as m utual funds, hedge funds, 
investment companies, or simply non life insurance companies. However, we do believe that pension funds 
and life insurance companies are  particular because of the long-term structure of their liabilities (see 
Impavido and Musalem (2000) who underline the different impacts of contractual savings and non life 
insurance companies on capital markets).  
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Moreover, in the present context of financial instability, developing countries may find 
worthwhile to develop a domestic source of long-term financing.
6  
 
Therefore, this study comes as a necessary complement to earlier works stressing 
the impact of financial and legal institutions on firms’ financing patterns in a cross-
country perspective.
7 In an asymmetric information world in which conflicts of interest 
between external investors and those who manage and control the productive assets, the 
financial institutions and the legal environment
8 will shape the capital structures
9 of 
firms, leading to systematic differences across countries. To the extent that contractual 
savings institutions modify the information set available to all investors, push for 
compliance with transparency rules and legal rights, or simply modify the relative supply 
of different securities, one should indeed expect to observe significant cross-country 
differences explained by contractual savings’ characteristics.  
 
We address the following questions. First, as contractual savings institutions 
develop, is there a sizeable impact on firms’ leverage and debt maturity? Second, can 
such an impact be accounted for by the characteristics of firms in each country? Third, 
does this effect remain significant once we control for the activity of the banking sector, 
the size and activity of the stock market in each country, and unobserved fixed 
characteristics? Fourth, can we disentangle the potential channels through which 
contractual savings institutions affect firms’ capital structures? Finally, what do our 
results imply for the resilience of domestic financial systems in the highly volatile 
environment of the international financial architecture? 
 
We show that the development of contractual savings institutions, as well as their 
portfolio decisions, have significant impacts on firms’ financing patterns, after 
controlling for firms’ characteristics and macroeconomic determinants. We identify 
different channels through which contractual savings affect the financing decisions of 
firms. In bank-based economies, the development of contractual savings is associated 
with an increase in firms’ leverage and maturity of debt. In market-based economies, 
instead, the asset allocation affects firms’ leverage: an increase in the proportion of shares 
in the portfolio of contractual savings is associated with a decrease in firms’ leverage. In 
a nutshell, the development and equity investments of contractual savings institutions are 
associated with an increase in the use of long-term finance. In the present context of 
highly volatile international capital movements, this can be a crucial role for domestic 
financial institutions. The policy implications of the paper are clear. If demographic, 
institutional and political preconditions are met for pension reforms
10 (or reform of the 
insurance industry), policy makers should pay particular attention to investment policies 
that enhance the contractual savings industry. The regulation, in particular for equity 
                                                 
6 Walker and Lefort (2000) argue that equity investments by fully privately managed pension systems have 
reduced price volatility in Argentina, Chile and Peru. 
7 See Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic‘s papers. 
8 Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996, 1999), Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1999) and La Porta et al. 
(1998). 
9 See Shleifer and Vishny (1997) for a survey on corporate governance, La Porta et al.(1998) for the impact 
of the legal environment on external finance. 
10 See for instance Vittas (2000).  
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investments, m ay have a large impact, as suggested by our preliminary results, when 
portfolio limits happen to be binding. In addition, policy interventions should be based 
upon a precise evaluation of the interaction between institutional investors and other 
components of the financial system (especially banks), and should strongly avoid creating 
a captive source of funds. 
 
There exists a rich literature that explores the effect of the institutional 
environment on firm financing choices in specific countries and across countries. Overall,  
it confirms that the institutional environment, together with the real characteristics of 
firms, determines the capital structures of firms.  
 
First, the legal approach, led by La Porta and al. (1998), shows how legal 
traditions and specific creditors and minority shareholders rights shape the access to 
external finance and the corporate ownership structures around the world. Second, Rajan 
and Zingales (1995) and Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1995) document cross-
country regularities in the correlation between corporate financial structures and various 
firms’ characteristics. Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996) explore the impact of 
stock market development on firms’ leverage and Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 
(1999) extend this analysis b y looking more closely at the institutional and legal 
determinants of capital structure. They find that how much the firm can grow by relying 
on external finance does depend on the legal environment.
11  Rajan and Zingales (1998) 
and Carlin and Mayer (1999) disentangle the financial, legal and technological factors 
that determine firms’ access to external finance. Third, others highlight the impact of 
particular institutional arrangements on firms’ external financing possibilities (see for 
instance Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991)). Fourth, firms’ characteristics will 
affect the financing choices: for instance firms try to match the maturity of their assets 
and liabilities (See Caprio and Demirguc-Kunt (1997) for a discussion). Moreover, 
informational asymmetries affect the choice of security when seeking for external 
finance, and restrict  the feasibility set (see, among others,
12 Barclay and Smith (1995), 
Stoh and Mauer (1996), Myers and Majluf (1984), Rajan (1992), Petersen and Rajan 
(1994), Diamond (1991), Jensen and Meckling (1976), Myers (1977)). Overall, the 
existing literature confirms that the institutional environment, together with the real 
characteristics of firms, determines the capital structures of firms.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly lists the potential 
mechanisms that explain why the development of contractual savings institutions may 
modify the corporate financing patterns. Section 3 sketches a model of firms’ financing 
choices and provides a benchmark for discussing the interaction between informational 
issues and corporate capital structures in the context of contractual savings development. 
Section 4 introduces the data and discusses the variables used. Section 5 reports cross-
country empirical results. Finally, Section 6 is devoted to a discussion of our results and 
of policy implications. 
                                                 
11 See Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, Levine, and Maksimovic (2000) for a synthetic approach, at three different 
levels (firms, industries and countries). 
12 See the survey by Harris and Raviv (1991) and Stulz (2000).  
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2. Contractual Savings Institutions and Corporate Financing 
Patterns 
  The development of pension funds and life insurance companies (that are 
contractual savings institutions) involves a gradual accumulation of long-term financial 
resources, in order to provide a variety of services: pension and life insurance benefits, as 
well as schemes tailored for unemployment, end-of-service indemnity, down payment for 
housing, education, weddings, or funerals. Although there is no evidence of a substantial 
impact on the aggregate saving rate (see Davis (1995) and Bailliu and Reisen (1997)), 
there is little doubt that the composition of savings is altered following the development 
of contractual savings institutions.
13 Consequently, the supply of long-term capital 
increases,
14 which will modify the financial structure of the economy, and therefore the 
financing possibilities of firms. 
 
The impact of contractual savings development on  capital market size and 
efficiency may be direct or indirect ( Impavido and Musalem (2000) and Catalan, 
Impavido and Musalem (2000) provide empirical evidence on the links and causality 
between capital market size - and deepening - and contractual savings development and 
portfolio allocation). First, it is likely that pension funds and life insurance companies are 
more willing to hold market securities and long-term debt than are individual investors
15 - 
this has a direct impact on the size of securities markets. Second, these institutions act as 
a countervailing force to existing commercial and investment banks (see Vittas (1999) for 
examples). Hence they foster competition and thus efficiency of loans and primary 
securities markets. Third, they promote financial innovation
16 and modernization of 
trading systems. Fourth, professional asset management activities increase the pressure 
for investor protection,
17 transparency,
18 and sound governance practices. As dominant 
minority shareholders, they are bound to move from passive asset management activities 
to active corporate governance in the firms in which they invest.
19 Fifth, institutional 
investors development may enhance the deepening of the public debt market and 
progressively help to build a yield curve. Sixth, Impavido and Musalem (2000) argue that 
contractual savings institutions development is conducive to financial and macro 
economic stability and resilience to shocks. The existence of large domestic institutional 
                                                 
13 Impavido and Musalem (2000) and Vittas (1999, 2000) provide a detailed analysis of the main arguments 
of this section. 
14 In the case of Chile, the financial assets held by contractual savings institutions have increased from 18% 
of GDP in 1988  to 53% of GDP in 1997. 
15 Transaction costs on capital markets, the ability to diversify their portfolio, and the long-term structure of 
their liabilities are possible explanations. However, in principle, the net aggregate effect on the supply of 
long term savings may be ambiguous if mandatory contributions lead individuals to save more in liquid 
assets. 
16 For instance the use of derivative and asset backed securities (see Davis, 1995). 
17 In particular, the protection of minority shareholders rights. 
18 According to Vittas (1999), pension reform in Chile led to an increase in the quality of private ratings by 
the creation of a committee that rates various instruments for their suitability as pension fund investments. 
19 More on this in the next section.  
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investors may explain the insulation of the Chilean and South African stock markets from 
the contagion effects
20 of the recent financial crisis.  
 
What are the preconditions to pension reform and the development of contractual 
savings institutions? 
 
“Feasibility” conditions, as argued by Vittas (1999, 2000) may be less stringent 
than expected if a gradual approach is chosen. They include macroeconomic stability and 
fiscal discipline, the existence of a core of efficient and sound banking and insurance 
institutions, and a lasting commitment for the creation of an effective regulatory and 
supervisory agency. The investment regulations and traditions may also have a significant 
impact on contractual savings behavior. Moreover, the experience of Peru and several 
Arab countries tend to favor a gradual approach if the demand for domestic public debt 
does not materialize or if only a handful of firms have access to capital markets. A 
careful macroeconomic management is therefore needed in order to avoid situations in 
which the existing demand does not absorb the accumulated resources.  
 
Finally, the impact of contractual savings development will not materialize until a 
“critical” mass of savings has been mobilized.  
 
For all these reasons, the development of contractual savings institutions, in order 
to be successful, requires a lasting commitment of policymakers to foster sound practices. 
 
The development of contractual savings institutions modifies the efficiency and 
the structure of the financial system. It will thus affect, and most likely increase, the set 
of available external financing possibilities for firms. Generally, we should expect an 
increased reliance on long term finance in countries in which contractual savings are 
getting larger. The development of a public debt market will provide a benchmark yield 
for corporate debt, enhancing the development of a corporate bond market. The supply of 
equity finance will be also stimulated.
21 More specifically, the cost of equity should fall 
because (1) their large size allows institutional investors to diversify their portfolio, hence 
they will be willing to hold shares of a given firm at a lower risk premium, (2) the 
liquidity premium should also fall for the following reasons: (a) contractual savings can 
invest in long term instruments without incurring a balance sheet mismatch between 
assets and liabilities, (b) newly created funds, as they enlarge their contribution base, tend 
to adopt “buy and hold” strategies and modify their portfolio at the margin, by the 
allocation of new flows. (3) In markets with significant transaction costs (see Pagano 
(1989) for a theoretical framework of volatile capital markets), large institutional 
investors can exploit economies of scale. (4) There are efficiency gains if the 
development of institutional investors leads to a decrease in underwriting costs. 
                                                 
20 Kaminsky et al. (1999) provide evidence of contagion in the behavior of both individual investors and 
fund managers of US mutual funds investing in Latin America. See also Walker and Lefort (2000). 
21 Legal issues may also impede the firm ability to increase its equity capital. In Germany, for instance, the 
decision to increase - or decrease – equity cannot be taken by the management board. It is made by vote at 
the shareholders’ general meeting and usually require a 75% majority.  
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Generally, the existence of large institutional investors provides a stable demand for 
securities in primary markets.  
 
The aggregate impact on firms’ leverage is however not clear-cut. The 
development of stock markets may lead to an increase in the debt-to-equity ratio if 
informational spillovers from the stock market to the banking sector are large enough 
(see next section).
22 Informational mechanisms are likely to be stronger in countries in 
which contractual savings institutions invest more in shares and are relatively active 
monitors of public firms. The impact on the debt maturity is also an empirical issue. 
Indeed, if banks do not change significantly their loan policies, one should observe an 
increase in debt maturity on average. Moreover, if contractual savings institutions are 
complementary to banks, one should observe an increase in the maturity of bank loans as 
the balance sheet mismatch of banks is reduced. However, banks may respond to greater 
competition by concentrating on their core comparative advantage - that is their superior 
ability to monitor firms. If this happens, they will increase short-term loans. In this 
situation, the debt maturity will fall. The dominant effect will depend on whether 
contractual savings institutions invest in shares, bonds, make direct loans, or are large 
depositors in the banking system. In the two first cases, competition issues are more 
likely to dominate whereas the complementarity effect will be stronger in the last case. 
But competition per se does not imply a fall in the debt maturity if the fall in bank loans 
maturity is more than compensated by increased maturity of corporate bonds - this is an 
empirical issue.  
3. A Simple Model of Firms’ Financing Choices  
In this section, we briefly sketch the main features and conclusions of a model 
developed in a companion paper.
23 This model emphasizes informational issues
24 and 
refinancing risks. More specifically, we provide a simple framework in which firms 
choose the debt maturity and can also issue equity. We discuss within this framework the 
potential benefits associated with the development of stock markets, and the nature of 
investors. 
3.1 The Corporate Sector 
There is a continuum of firms differing with respect to their initial equity ER<1. 
Each firm has access to a project that requires an investment I=1. The investment can be 
spread between date 0 and date 1, under the following constraints: 
 
(1)  The present value of the two investments I0 and I1, respectively at dates 0 and  
1, is equal to the total investment:  I0+ I1/R = 1, where R-1 is the safe interest 
rate (the return on government bonds). 
                                                 
22 And the paper by Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996). 
23 See Tressel (2001). 
24 More specifically, we focus on adverse selection issues, and the role of private information in the credit 
relationship. The literature has highlighted many considerations also relevant for the debt maturity decision 
that we won’t tackle here: underinvestment (Myers (1977)), short-termism (Von Thadden (1995)), ex-post 
moral hazard (Rajan (1992), Rajan and Petersen (1994)), among others.  
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(2)  The initial investment I0 must be strictly positive:
25  
0 0 > ‡g I  
 
If the initial investment is realized and is not liquidated at date 1, the project will 
yield cash flows for all dates t>1. However, there are two types of firms in the economy. 
Good firms yield strictly positive cash flows P
26 at each date t>1, and can be liquidated 
at date 1 for l*I0, where l<1. Bad firms yield no cash flows. They are worth nothing if the 
project is terminated at date 1. Firms’ types are private information, and cannot be 
credibly signaled to outsiders (creditors and new shareholders). The uncertainty regarding 
the project is measured by l, the prior probability assigned by external providers of funds 
(banks or investors) that the firm is good at date 0. 
 
Figure 1: Summary of the Events 
Cash Flows:      - I0                         - I1                        + P                       + P                       + P  ...
Date 0                        Date 1                         Date 2                     Date 3                    Date 4 ...
Initial  Investment I0




STD is rolled over or not
(refinancing risk)
Information  Arrival  lI and lE
Debt is repaid (STD or LTD)
Dividend payment (and for all
subsequent dates)
 
The firm is run by a manager (who may be the controlling shareholder) who 
maximizes the expected discounted value of dividends paid to initial shareholders. As 
dividends will be the same in all periods, for t>2, this is equivalent to: 
                                                 
25 As become clear in the analysis of short-term debt, firms that are good risks choose to minimize the first 
period short-term debt, in order to reduce the cross-subsidization of bad risks. If no constraint is imposed, 
they would choose not to borrow short-term at date 0. The constraint we impose here can be endogenized 
as in Rajan and Petersen (1994) by adding a moral hazard imperfection at date 1.  
26 P is assumed to be greater than R
2 so that in the perfect information case, all firms have access to LTD.  
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where Div2 is the date 2 dividend received by the initial shareholders, B the 
discounted value at date 2 of dividends for t>2,
27 and E0 the expectation operator at date 
0. 
 
More precisely, Div2 = P - R’*D, when no shares are issued, where D is the face 
value of the debt and R’ the gross repayment per dollar borrowed. 
 
However, the firm undertakes the project if and only if it yields a greater cash 
flow than simply investing in government bonds: 
 
We assume that a firm cannot have a mix of short term and long term debt. 
Therefore external financing (I- ER) possibilities are: 
 
(1) Short-term debt only (in this case the debt must be rolled over at date 1). 
(2) Long-term debt only (the debt is issued at date 0 and repaid at date 2). 
(3) A combination of short-term debt and external equity. 
(4) A combination of long-term debt and external equity. 
 
  These financing possibilities are briefly described in the following paragraphs. 
 
3.2 Long Term Debt 
 
  Banks are perfectly competitive. They gather savings from households and invest 
them in loans to either the public sector (government bonds) or to the private sector 
(corporate bonds). The structure of the economy is similar to Diamond’s model with 
banking and limited access to the stock market (see Diamond (1997)). In particular, 
households are subject to liquidity needs at date 1. As in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), 
this feature may lead to runs (see the short-term debt section below) and firms may not be 
refinanced to complete the project. In the case of long-term debt, banks cannot force 
firms into liquidation when they face sudden withdrawals (and I0=1). 
 
  For the sake of simplicity, long-term debt is repaid once and for all at date 2.
28 Ex-
ante competition among banks implies that banks make zero expected profits on loans: 
                                                 











 where Div’ is the dividend at each period t>2. 
 
( ) B Div MaxE + 2 0





the expected rate of return on loans must be equal to the safe interest rate per period. 
However, as a proportion 1-l of loans are never repaid, banks charge a two period gross 
return equal to 
l
2 R
per unit of capital borrowed.
29 
  In this imperfect information world, some firms won’t get access to long-term 
debt (LTD). Indeed, banks refuse to lend whenever the maximum expected return on the 
















  The rationing region [0 ; E1] becomes larger if the profitability of good firms fall, 
if the cost of capital R increases, or if informational frictions increase (l increases). 
3.3 Refinancing Risk and Financial Institutions 
(1) Short term Debt  
The firm may be able to obtain a short-term loan from a bank when long-term 
debt is not accessible. The existing relationship between the bank and the borrower 
allows the former to obtain private information about the quality of the project; by 
lending at short horizons, the bank can decide not to refinance the project if it obtains bad 
information on the firm (see Sharpe (1990), Rajan and Petersen (1994), and Stulz (2000) 
for a survey). In parallel, the bank gets an informational advantage with respect to other 
potential lenders, because the latter has a less precise information on the quality of the 
borrower at the interim date (more on this latter). Therefore, the initial l ender can 
compensate initial losses on bad projects by charging a higher interest rate on second 
period loans. This process, known as staged financing, makes short-term debt more 
feasible in uncertain environment.
30  
 
The information game is modeled in the following way: by lending to a firm in 
the first period, a bank is able to refine the information on the quality of the project. More 
specifically, we assume that the bank can get two possible signals at date 1: 
   
(a) signal down : 
  Signal down reveals with probability 1 that the firm is of bad type. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
28 In the general case, long-term debt is repaid in n periods between date k and date k+n, with k, n finite, 
and  k>1. It is straighforward to show that the qualitative results are not modified by this simplification. See 
Tressel (2001) for a detailed justification. 





  (b) signal up : 
The bank may receive signal up for both types of firms. However, this signal 
reduces the uncertainty on the type of the borrower. The probability of being good given 
signal up is lI. Other banks also receive a signal; however, their information is less 
precise: the probability that the firm is good given signal up is lE, with lI> lE> l. This 
difference between private (measured by lI ) and public information (measured by lE) 
creates a captive market for each bank at date 1, composed by the firms that it financed at 
date 0, and receiving signal up. Other banks will charge a gross rate of return equal to 
R/lE. However, the incumbent bank is willing to lend as long as the rate of return on the 
loan is greater or equal to R/lI which is strictly less than R/lE. Therefore that bank will 
be able to make positive profits on the firms it already financed by proposing a loan with 
a gross rate of return R/lE-e (with e -->0). Finally, ex-ante competition among banks 
(i.e. at date 0) implies that expected profits of banks must be zero: their positive profits 
between date 1 and 2 compensate the losses made between date 0 and 1. Clearly, this 
means that more firms are funded at date 0: the threshold value E 2 under which the firm 
is rationed with short-term debt is lower
31 than E1. 
 
The drawback of short-term debt
32 is that if the bank refuses to roll over the debt, 
the firm will be forced into liquidation. We model the refinancing risk in the next section. 
(2) Bank runs and refinancing risks 
  The initial lender will not refinance the project if it receives bad news on the 
borrower’s type (signal down). However,  inefficient liquidation may also occur, 
depending on the stability of the banking system, if for instance, depositors and generally 
banks’ lenders have no confidence in the ability of banks to serve sudden withdrawals. 
Diamond and Dybvig (1983)
33 have rationalized the possibility of self-fulfilling runs 
when banks serve investors sequentially by drawing on a small liquidity reserve: it is 
rational for each individual creditor to join a run, since by doing so it secures a chance to 
be at the beginning of the queue and get his money back. Next, the question of 
equilibrium selection is addressed in the following way: we adopt the convention that 
investors coordinate on one equilibrium or the other depending on the realization of a 
sunspot variable: runs occur with a probability m. 
 
  The liquidation value of the initial investment I0 is l* I0 with l<1. 
 
  However, banks’ assets are firms’ liabilities. The ability of banks to get repaid in 
full (by refusing to roll over the debt, which forces the firm in bankruptcy, unless it can 
find other lenders) depends on the liabilities of the firm. Let us assume that the firm will 
                                                                                                                                                 
30 However, the market power of the incumbent bank may create distorsions ex-post, see for instance Rajan 
(1992), and Sharpe (1990)). 
31 More precisely, this is the case only if the refinancing risk described below is not too large. 
32 Long-term finance, contrary to short-term debt contracts, may also reduce “short-termisn” in the behavior 
of managers, see Von Thadden (1995). 
33 For the recent literature on the fragility of the banking system in the context of the recent financial crisis 
and capital flows, see Chang and Velasco (1999), Rodrik and Velasco (1999), among others.  
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not find other external funds if the initial lender refuses to roll over the debt (for instance, 
because of contagion, runs may occur on the whole banking system). Therefore the firm 
is forced to liquidate its assets
34 to repay the debt, hence goes bankrupt. The issue here is 
that bankruptcy occurs because of the mismatch between liabilities and assets in the 
corporate sector, that is because short term debt is used to finance long term, illiquid, 
productive investment. If the firm has a low debt-equity ratio, it will be able to repay the 
debt fully because equity acts as a cushion. On the contrary, if the firm is highly 
indebted, early liquidation implies that the bank cannot get the full value of the debt. 
Hence the bank may not be able to obtain enough liquidity if depositors (or generally all 
banks’ creditors) decide to run (or not renew their loans to the bank).  
 
The argument goes like this. Each bank borrows from many investors, and lends 
to many firms. We assume that investors observe the average capital structure of these 
firms, hence know the value of bank assets in case of early liquidation. If the value of the 
short-term debt is less than the liquidation value of the firm,
35 investors know that they 
will be fully repaid in case of run. Therefore, they have no reason to run in the first place 
(and to expect other investors to do so). On the contrary, if the date 1 value of the debt is 
more than the liquidation value of the firm, then runs are possible. They will occur with a 
probability m. 
 
  Formally, runs are possible (and occur with probability ? ) if and only if: 
Where R0-1 is the rate of interest on the short-term debt STD0. 
 
  We can show (see Tressel (2001) f or details) that, for intermediate values of m, 
two types of firms will finance their project with STD rather than LTD: (1) firms that 
have limited internal liquidity, that cannot borrow long-term and which face a positive 
probability of runs. And (2) firms that have important reserves relative to their borrowing 
needs and which do not face a refinancing risk.
36 For intermediate values of liquidity 







                                                 
34 Here we formally assume that each bank lends to a homogenous group of firms. This is obviously not 
realistic. This assumption is purely technical and does not affect the general argument. 
35 Here we formally assume that each bank lends to only one firm. This assumption is purely technical. In a 
more general context, the occurrence of runs should depend on the average capital structure of firms 
financed by a bank. See Tressel (2001) for a discussion. 
36 In this case, STD is cheaper than LTD because of its informational advantage.  
0 0 0 I l STD R ￿ > ￿ 
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Figure 2: Debt Maturity Choice 
0                 E 2                             E 1                    Ê                     1            E R
Rationing               STD                        LTD                      STD
     with refinancing risk                          No  Refinancing Risk
 
(3) Equity Markets 
  Firms may also increase their capital by issuing equity on the stock market. We 
neglect underwriting costs and assume that new shares are sold to dispersed investors so 
that the initial shareholder keeps all the control rights (see for instance Pagano and Röell 
(1998) and Shleifer and Wolfenson (2000) for a similar assumption). The equity contract 
for new (minority) shareholders is the following:  
 
(1) each minority shareholder i invests Ei in the project at date 0. 
(2) He receives a proportion ai of all future cash flows, net of debt repayment, where  
ai =Ei/E (E is total equity). 
 
  However, investors in the stock market do not observe the type of a firm at date 0: 
they only know that a proportion l of firms are good. The participation constraint for an 
investor is therefore: 
 
 
  This condition assumes that (1) investors are risk-neutral (this assumption may 
depend on preferences and the ability of investors to hold a diversified portfolio), (2) 
there are no transaction costs on the stock market, (3) there are no liquidity premium on 
stocks, (4) the controlling shareholder of a firm cannot expropriate minority shareholders 
(in that situation, the effectiveness of investor protection can be crucial, see the 
theoretical analysis of Shleifer and Wolfenson{2000}) 
 
  By relaxing one or several of these assumptions, we can formally derive simple 
equity rationing rules (that depend on investors’ characteristics and the regulatory 
environment) affecting each firm willing to raise capital on the stock market.  
   
( ) i i E R B Div E ￿ ‡ +
2
2 0 la 
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  The objective function of the controlling shareholder is now: 
where  ￿ =
i
i a a . 
The initial shareholder may decide to issue equity (1) to be able to undertake the 
project (eliminate the rationing situation),
37 (2) to be able to borrow long-term, or (3) or 
to be able to borrow short-term with no refinancing risk. The cost of raising equity on the 
stock market is that profits have to be shared with new shareholders.
38  
 
For intermediate values of the informational advantage of short-term debt 
(measured by 1/l-1/lI) and the refinancing risk (measured by m), the model predicts that: 
 
(1) firms with few initial reserves will issue shares so that they can borrow with long-
term debt ( i.e. they issue EX= E1-ER), 
(2) firms with larger initial reserves issue shares so that they can  borrow with short-
term debt and no refinancing risk (they issue EX=Ê-ER). 
 
Figure 3: Equity Issues 
0            E 1                               E 2                                                     Ê                    1     E
           Share Issues to E 2                                       Share Issues to Ê
Expropriation of minority shareholders: 
  We can introduce in this setting the possibility for the controlling shareholder to 
divert part of the cash flows after debt repayment. This can be done by assuming that the 
                                                 
37 More precisely, the argument here is that the optimal financing strategy for some projects implies a mix 
of debt and equity finance, and that debt finance only may not be possible for projects either highly 
uncertain and/or with few cash flows in the short/medium run. For instance, Eurotunnel had its debt 
swapped into equity when it became clear that debt repayments were not sustainable. A substantial dilution 
of property rights followed – at the expense of minority shareholders. 
38 We are assuming here that the issuing price of shares is p=1: the controlling shareholder is not able to 
extract any of the additional return that investors get by buying shares instead of buying bonds. 
( )( ) B Div MaxE + - 2 0 1 a 
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controlling shareholder is able to hide (and consume) a non verifiable proportion k of the 
dividends, and claim that the present value of total dividends is only (1-k)(Div2 + B). 
Now, a minority shareholder with a stake ai in the firm will only receive: 
 
The participation constraint of investors may imply the possibility of equity rationing for 
firms that are otherwise able to borrow from a bank. The value of k depends on the legal 
environment  (transparency rules, protection of minority shareholders, etc.).  
 
(4) Predictions of the Model 
  This model provides predictions on (1) the characteristics of firms that benefit 
from an increase in long term credit or in equity, (2) the impact of information and 
corporate governance mechanisms on the debt maturity structure.  
 
(1) Consider first an exogenous increase in the supply of long term credit. Start, for 
instance, from a situation in which long-term debt contracts are not proposed by banks. 
This may be the consequence of a lack of long-term liabilities in the banking system, 
making the probability of sudden withdrawal high, so that banks are reluctant to perform 
their term transformation activity.
39  It is reasonable to assume that an exogenous increase 
in the maturity of banks’ liabilities may make banks willing to propose long-term 
contracts. The model predicts that: 
 
(A) The firms that will benefit more from long-term loans are those:
40 
(a) with less initial asymmetric information (m).
41 
(b) with less liquid investments (i.e. lower value of l). 
(c) with intermediate values of internal liquid reserves 
 (i.e. firms with E1 < ER < Ê). 
(d) with no access to STD without refinancing risk (i.e. ER < Ê), the firms that 
will benefit more from LTD are the more profitable ones (P larger). 
(e) with higher up-front investments (g). 
 
(B) More firms will benefit from an increased supply of long term debt when:  
(a) the banking system is more subject to runs (m large) because STD becomes 
more costly to firms. 
(b) the informational advantage (1/l - 1/lI) of STD is lower, because the benefit 
of STD is reduced. 
                                                 
39Although the model does not integrate why banks are or are not willing  to offer long-term loans, it allows 
to discuss the impact on firms’ financing choices when LTD contracts are proposed. 
40 In each case, all parameters, expect the one considered, are fixed. 
41 In this case, we extend the model to consider that we have several “sectors”, each being characterized by 
a given value of the parameter m. 
( )( ) B Div i + - 2 1 k la 
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(c) the market power of banks in the second period is lower (measured by lI/lE): 
in this situation, banks charge a higher interest rate in the first period, hence more 
firms become subject to the refinancing risk. 
 
(2) Consider a reduction in equity rationing. This may happen because: (1) investors 
require a lower risk premium, or liquidity premium, to buy shares, (2) transaction costs 
are reduced, (3) there is less scope for minority shareholders expropriation. 
 
(A) As illustrated in Figure 3, the average impact on the debt maturity is not clear-cut. In 
particular, it depends on the initial internal reserves of the firm. If firms are initially 
relatively well capitalized, the debt maturity will decrease; on the contrary, if firms have 
limited initial capital, the debt maturity will increase. 
 
(B) The firms that will benefit more from an easier access to the stock market are those: 
(a) with low or intermediate internal reserves,  
(b) with lower liquidation value l, 
(c) with higher up-front investments (g). 
 
(C) More firms will benefit from an easier access to the stock market when the banking 
system is more subject to runs (m large). 
 
(3) Information Disclosure and Corporate Governance. We discuss here the impact of 
exogenous modifications in the informational parameters on firms’ financing choices. 
 
(A) If the quality of ex-ante public information increases (l increases), more firms have 
access to long-term debt (E1 is lower). 
 
(B) If the quality of interim public information increases relative to the initial public 
information (lE/l increases), the second period interest rate on STD decreases. Hence, to 
maintain profitability, banks increase the first period interest rate on STD. This, in turn, 
increases the risk of early liquidation, which makes STD less attractive relative to LTD. 
 
(C) If transparency increases at the interim date, relative to the private information of 
banks (lE/lI increases), the second period market power of banks decreases, which forces 
them to increase the first period interest rate on STD to maintain their expected  
profitability. Again, the refinancing risk increases, which makes STD less attractive than 
LTD. 
 
(D) If, l, lE and lI increase in the same proportion (both public information and private 
information),
42 short-term debt becomes relatively less attractive than long term debt (the 
reduction in the cost of debt by choosing STD instead of LTD is lower). 
                                                 
42 This may be interpreted in term of shareholder activism: shareholder activism increases the transparency 
on the stock market, and simultaneously increases the efficiency of bank monitoring.  
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(5) Contractual Savings Development 
 
As already noticed, the development of contractual savings may have an impact 
on the corporate financing decisions for the following reasons: 
 
(1) Many developing countries lack a source a long-term credit (Caprio and Demirguc-
Kunt (1997)). The two main explanations are : (a) there is no market for long term public 
debt that would provide a benchmark for corporate bonds yields; (b) in a highly uncertain 
environment, short-term debt will be preferred to long-term debt. Assuming an enabling 
macroeconomic environment, the development of contractual savings institutions will 
provide a stable source of long term capital which will allow a market for long term 
public debt to be progressively developed, providing a benchmark yield curve for 
corporate bonds. Initial uncertainty may also be reduced, at least for sufficiently large 
firms, if we expect contractual savings institution to foster information disclosure in the 
stock and bond markets.
43 
 
(2) Contractual savings, as potentially large investors in the stock market, may lower the 
cost of equity for firms. The existence of large contractual savings institutions provides a 
stable demand that facilitates the placement of new stocks by the underwriter (the market 
power of the underwriter may also decrease). Because of the particular structure of their 
liabilities (long term), the liquidity premium that they require in order to hold stocks is 
lower. Similarly, they tend to accept a lower risk premium because of their ability to 
diversify risk. Finally, as large financial intermediaries, they are able to exploit returns to 
scale. All those factors tend to affect directly the activity on primary equity markets, by 
reducing the cost of issuance (or equity rationing in the model). 
 
(3) The behavior of contractual savings on the secondary market may also be crucial. 
First, as already noticed, they may have stronger motivation and ability than individual 
investors to foster information disclosure rules. Moreover, they may have an advantage in 
information acquisition relative to individual investors. Contrary to mutual funds and 
hedge funds, they have a long-term interest in the performance of firms in which they are 
equity holders. Ultimately, this informational effect will make Initial Public Offerings 
more attractive to firms (for theoretical arguments, see Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) who 
emphasize the importance of market liquidity, and Tressel (1999) who points out the 
change in governance mechanisms when a firm goes public). Accordingly, they are less 
prone to herding behavior; although the managers‘ performance may still be assessed on 
short-term criteria (among which relative performance evaluation schemes), the 
contractual savings industry as a whole cannot face sudden withdrawals if based on 
mandated participation, and arguably individual defined benefit or close ended 
contractual savings institutions are n ot subject to runs. Moreover, in addition to their 
traditional portfolio management expertise, they have started to become active in 
corporate governance.
44 As they become dominant in size, a buy-and-sell strategy 
                                                 
43 See Iglesia-Palau (2000) for empirical evidence in Chile. 




45 and they will tend to hold stocks of a particular firm for longer 
periods. For instance, indexing strategies by U.S pension funds impose a constraint on 
selling underperformers and provide a motivation for shareholder activism.
46 This 
however depends strongly on the regulatory environment (and the prevailing ownership 
structures) and is a relatively recent phenomenon in the US
47 and the UK. Gillan and 
Stark (2000) show that shareholder activism by U.S. public pension funds has been 
successful in the past 10 years, as measured by voting outcomes and stock market 
reaction. However, the ability of contractual savings institutions to interfere with 
management and controlling shareholders (which are the same in many developing 
economies) may be strongly affected by the prevalent concentration of ownership, as 
suggested by the Chilean example (see Iglesia-Palau (2000)).
48 Generally, contractual 
savings institutions have the sufficient power to counterbalance the control of productive 
assets by controlling shareholders. Again, the regulation will be crucial and will aim at 
balancing the two following effects. On the one hand, contractual savings managers 
should be allowed to have a significant proportion of shares in their portfolio in order to 
have proper incentives to be active minority shareholders. On the other hand, excessive 
concentration of their ownership stakes in a limited number of firms may lead to 
collusion with the management against minority shareholders.
49 
 
(4) Finally, the development of contractual savings institutions, by increasing the supply 
of long-term finance, may also lead to efficiency gains by increasing the number of 
different groups of investors. Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) claim for instance that 
proper incentives require that the firm have several classes of e xternal investors. 
Shareholders will make efficient decisions when the firm has good results whereas 
debtholders will make efficient decisions when the firm is performing poorly. Efficiency 
requires diversity in the nature of funds providers. In the same v ein, Berglof and Von 
Thadden (1994) show that firms will choose to have more than one class of investors 
(typically long-term and short-term creditors). 
 
                                                 
45 There is evidence that institutional trading in the U.S. is associated with price pressure (Chan and 
Lakonishok (1993), Holthausen and al.(1990); or Brown and Brooke (1993)). This is even more likely to be 
the case in less liquid stock markets with large institutional investors holdings, like in Chile. In this latter 
case in which corporate ownership is highly concentrated in the hands of families, the issue is probably to 
enhance minority shareholders protection and activism. It is reasonable to argue that contractual savings are 
more likely than other minority shareholders to be able to affect entrenched management. Readers should 
refer to Gillan and Starks (2000) for more references. 
46 TIAA-CERF indexes 80% of its domestic portfolio ( Carleton et al. (1998)). CalPERS has annual 
turnover of its equity holdings of approximately 10%, and the New York Retirement funds a turnover of 
7%. 
47 “The SEC’s Shareholder Proposal Rule 14a-8 allows shareholders to submit issues for inclusion in the 
proxy material and for subsequent presentation at the annual general meeting. The proxy process has 
provided these shareholders with a formal mechanism through which concerns about corporate governance 
and corporate performance can be raised.” (Gillan and Starks (2000)). 
48 He argues that pension fund participation has had a positive impact on corporate governance in Chile: 
“(1) the number of independent board members has increased, (2) monitoring costs have decreased as a 
result of improved public information quality, (3) companies where pension funds have invested are under 
close public scrutiny, (4) shareholder meetings are becoming more relevant.” 
49 This argument has been used to justify investment limits of Chilean pension funds.   
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According to these arguments, the impact of contractual savings development on 
firms’ financing choices can be assessed by considering that (1) it leads to an increase in 
the supply of long-term debt, (2) it reduces equity rationing, (3) it fosters information 
disclosure on the stock market. 
 
The theoretical predictions imply that the development of contractual savings 
institutions will be more beneficial when projects are illiquid, when the banking sector is 
fragile and highly competitive. Although information disclosure tends to increase the 
maturity of debt, the impact of increased access to the equity market is ambiguous: it may 
either increase the maturity of debt, or decrease it, depending on whether firms initially 
have few liquid reserves or not. 
 
The equilibrium capital structures of firms will be a function of (1) their  
characteristics (maturity of assets, profitability, risk, asymmetry of information, etc.), (2) 
the efficiency of the financial system (for instance in generating - ex-ante and interim - 
private and public information), (3) the supply of funds to capital markets, that are 
affected by the nature of investors. 
 
4. Data and Empirical Strategy 
 
4.1 Data 
We use data from Worldscope, a firm-level database that has been widely used in 
recent papers. It includes publicly listed corporations in 54 countries. Our sample 
includes all companies except financial firms. We use an unbalanced sample of firms 
over the period 1989-1998, in order to maximize the time-series dimension for each 
country. We require having data on at least 10 firms per year in each country.
50  
 
The database on contractual savings is taken from Impavido and Musalem (2000), 
extended for several countries (Argentina, Brazil, India and Mexico). It includes 
information from different sources (including the OECD institutional investors database, 
and national sources) on total assets, financial assets, and allocation of assets for pension 
funds and insurance companies. 
 
All other macroeconomic variables are obtained from various sources: 
Datastream, the World Development Indicators, and the Bank for International 
Settlement for bond markets data and the database constructed by Beck and al. (2000). 
 
                                                 
50 Except for Luxembourg for which we have only 9 firms, and one single year of observation  (in 1995) for 
the contractual savings data (so this country is dropped in all panel estimations).  
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4.2 Definition of Variables and Empirical Strategy 
The empirical study aims at assessing the impact of contractual savings 
institutions development on firms’ capital structures. The two fundamental characteristics 
that we analyze are: (i) the choice between debt and equity and (ii) the maturity structure 
of debt.  We focus on pooled (OLS) estimates, robust to heteroskedasticity, and panel 
estimates (fixed effects).  
 
The dependent variables that we consider are: (i) total debt over equity (TDTE), 
defined as the ratio of long-term plus short-term debt over the book value of equity, (ii) 
long-term debt over the book value of equity (LTDTE), (iii) short-term debt over the 
book value of equity (STDTE), and (iv) long term debt over total debt as a measure of 
debt maturity (LTDTD). 
 
These variables are self-explanatory; note however that we choose to use the book 
value of equity rather than the market value. Although the market value of equity may be 
a better measure of the “true” value of the firm’s net worth than its book value,
51 using 
the market value may introduce a spurious correlation between these dependent  variables 
and the contractual savings variables simply because contractual savings investments (for 
instance in shares) are evaluated at their market value. We will return to this issue later.  
 
  We use three sets of explanatory variables: (i) firms’ characteristics, (ii) 
macroeconomic factors, and (iii) financial system characteristics. 
(1) Firm-specific Characteristics 
Firm-specific considerations are important in determining the corporate financing 
patterns. The asymmetries of information and risk aspects to which firms are exposed 
will in general vary from firm to firm. Therefore, the macroeconomic and institutional 
environment may only partly explain the observed capital structures in different 
countries. For instance, the apparent lack of long-term finance in developing countries 
when compared with developed countries may simply be the consequence of cross-
country differences at the corporate level rather than institutional factors.
52 
 
We define the following firms’ specific control variables (see Table 2). 
 
First, in accord with Myers’ theory of underinvestment (1977), Barclay and Smith 
(1995) have shown that firms with more growth options in their investment opportunity 
sets have less long-term debt in their capital structure. The reason is that stockholders 
have incentives to reject profitable investments when they have to share their benefits 
with debtholders. Myers argues that, for a given indebtedness, this incentive problem can 
                                                 
51 This is less likely to be the case in highly volatile and illiquid stock markets. Moreover, the market value 
may deviate from the fundamental if a bubble develops. 
52 As shown by Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999), however, the institutional environment (i.e. the 
development of the financial and legal systems) does affect firms’ financing decisions after controlling for 
cross-country differences in the averaged firms’ characteristics.   
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be mitigated by shortening the maturity of debt.
53 We control for this by including as an 
explanatory variable the market to book ratio (a proxy for Tobin’s Q) defined as the ratio 
of the sum of the market value of equity plus the book value of total debt over the book 
value of assets ( i.e. the sum of the book value of equity plus the book value of debt). We 
expect that, if the market to book ratio is a good proxy for growth opportunities, we will 
observe a negative correlation between the long-term debt to total debt ratio and this 
variable. 
 
Second, theories of lending under asymmetric information show that the debt 
capacity of a firm depends on the availability of collateral. We use the proportion of net 
fixed assets in total assets as an indicator. Moreover, Stoh and Mauer (1996) have shown 
that firms in the U.S. match the maturity of assets and liabilities (as suggested by Hart 
and Moore (1994), but it is also the case if firms try to limit the risks of illiquidity). 
Therefore the maturity of debt may also be positively correlated with this variable.  
 
Third, as argued by Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999), high ratio of net 
sales to total assets may signal a need for short-term financing. To the extent that high 
sales (relative to total assets) imply high short-term assets (relative to total assets), 
maturity matching will also lead to a high short-term indebtedness. Thus, the ratio of net 
sales to total assets is also used as explanatory variable. 
 
Fourth, the size of the firm may be an important determinant of the firm  
indebtedness. A positive correlation between leverage and size is expected if the size is a 
proxy for the public information
54 and the reputation of the firm. A similar correlation is 
expected with the debt maturity. Barclay and Smith (1995) find that large firms have 
more long-term debt in their capital structure. 
 
Fifth, several studies in the past (Rajan and Zingales (1995) for developed 
economies and Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996) for emerging countries) have 
found a negative correlation between profitability and leverage. Although this correlation 
is not clearly explained, we also use a profitability measure in our regressions ( defined as 
earnings before taxes and interest expenses over total assets, deflated for inflation). 
 
Finally, risk considerations seem to be important determinants of corporate 
financing decisions (Graham and Harvey (2001)). Our risk control variable  at the firm 
level  is defined as the ratio of the standard deviation of earnings and the average of 
earnings over the period (in absolute value). 
(2) Macroeconomic Factors 
Various macroeconomic factors may affect the firms’ financing patterns. We use 
the Log of GDP per capita as a broad measure of economic development. Richer 
economies have in general more efficient institutions, a better compliance with the legal 
                                                 
53 Moreover, Fama (1980) shows that shortening the maturity of debt remains beneficial when stockholders 
can recapitalize the firm because the price at which they may repurchase the debt will reflect more the 
value of the investment for short-term debt than long-term debt. 
54 Note that all our firms are publicly listed.  
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system in general, and with investor rights, accounting standards and transparency rules 
(on the stock market) in  particular. The inflation rate is an indicator of both the 
government’s management of the economy and  whether long-term contracting is likely 
to be widespread. It characterizes also the opportunity cost of holding money. Debt 
contracts may be specified in nominal terms. So we expect a negative correlation between 
the rate of inflation and firms’ indebtedness. Two other control variables for asset 
markets conditions are: the real interest rate and the cost of equity.
55 Finally, the volatility 
of inflation is a proxy for macroeconomic instability.  
(3) Financial System Characteristics 
The financing patterns of firms, especially their access to external finance,
56 
depend on the characteristics of the financial system. This in turn affects the ability of 
firms to have a higher rate of growth than the one permitted by their internal resources.
57  
 
The stock market and banking sector variables provide a control group 
guarantying that our contractual savings variables are not simply a proxy for the level of 
development of the financial system. 
 
(a) The Stock Market 
First, we measure the size of stock markets by the stock market capitalization (in 
percentage of GDP). This variable has been widely used in the recent literature.  The 
ability of the stock market to provide risk diversification opportunities and information 
also depends on its level of activity and liquidity (Levine and Zervos (1998)). Greater 
liquidity will encourage investors to acquire stakes in risky firms
58 and will enhance 
information acquisition by large i nvestors (Holmstrom and Tirole (1993)). Greater 
informational content in prices will increase the efficiency of capital allocation. And 
better public information may have a spillover effect on the long-term debt market by 
reducing initial informational asymmetries, as illustrated in the model. Activity on the 
stock market is measured by the turnover ratio, that is the total value traded, in proportion 
of the stock market capitalization.  
 
(b) The Banking System 
Banks have a comparative advantage in acquiring private information on 
borrowers and in monitoring their actions. A sound and efficient banking sector is 
obviously essential for firms especially those that do not have access to capital markets. 
The use of short-term debt reduces the scope for opportunistic behavior, thus reducing the 
                                                 









where g is the average rate of growth of future earnings and P/E the current price-earnings ratio. 
For g we use the average rate of growth of earnings over the period, and we use the P/E ratio index in a 
given year provided by Datastream. 
56 Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996, 1999), Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Carlin and Mayer (1999). 
57 See Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, Levine and Maksimovic (2000) for a synthetic approach. 
58 And make efficient restructuring decisions, see Maug (1998) for a theoretical argument.  
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cost of monitoring. But the implication for the debt maturity of firms is not clear. A 
developed banking system implies lower monitoring costs in general. This will lead to an 
increase in the supply of short-term debt, but also in the supply in long-term debt in the 
sense that more projects will be able to be financed by long-term debt. The overall impact 
may be negative or positive. Moreover, monitoring  per se is not the only issue. The 
market structure of the banking sector (i.e. the degree of competition among banks, and 
the indirect competition from other financial institutions) will have an impact on the 
lending behavior of banks. For instance, greater information disclosure on the stock 
market and in general easier outside options for firms will impact the lending behavior of 
banks: their ex-post informational rent may be reduced, which may reduce their ex-ante 
incentive to invest in information (see Stulz (2000)). On the contrary, greater information 
disclosure and better accounting standards associated with capital market development 
are likely to increase the supply of bank credit  by limiting managerial slack. Finally, the 
development of non-bank financial intermediaries will probably not be neutral. This may 
increase competitive pressure on banks, leading them to specialize on their short-term 
debt comparative advantage. This competitive pressure may be direct or indirect. 
Contractual savings development may however complement the activity of the banking 
industry. This will be the case if these institutions act as suppliers of funds to the banking 
industry, instead of lending directly to firms. As contractual savings do not face 
unexpected liquidity needs, they will reduce the scope for bank runs, thus limiting the 
term transformation risk in the banking industry. Such a mechanism would increase the 
incentive of banks to offer long-term loans. As a measure of the activity of the banking 
sector, we use the total credit to the private sector, as a percentage of GDP. 
 
(c) Contractual Savings Institutions 
We define several variables that proxy for the development and investment 
behavior of contractual savings institutions. The first variable, CSFAGDP, is defined as 
total contractual savings financial assets, as a percentage of GDP. It measures the size of 
contractual savings institutions relative to the size of the economy.
59 The second variable 
describes the size of contractual savings institutions relative to capital markets 
(CSFAMKT). It is defined as the ratio of contractual savings financial assets to market 
capitalization plus total bonds outstanding (with maturity greater than one year). There 
are two motivations for this variable: (1) it grasps, although imperfectly, the relative 
importance of contractual savings as a provider of finance relative to total supply of long-
term finance; (2) it  partially corrects movements in the price of shares that may introduce 
a spurious correlation between our firm level variable and this explanatory variable (this 
is also true for the variable CSSHCAP defined below). Imagine for instance an 
exogenous rise in the prices of shares. Then the value of contractual savings assets and 
the stock market capitalization will increase, implying a correlation that has no economic 
meaning. Similarly, this may also introduce a negative correlation with firms’ debt equity 
ratio. This effect is likely to be stronger when we measure firm equity by the market 
value of the firm. This is the reason why, as discussed in the previous paragraph, we 
prefer the book value of equity rather than the market value. Still, in principle, a negative 
correlation (but presumably weaker) may remain because firms are sensitive to their 
                                                 
59 We define also the variable CSSHGDP, as contractual savings’ equity investments, as a % of GDP.  
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market value when they decide to issue new shares.
60 Thus, we use both variables in 
order to get a rough idea of such price effects. Finally, the behavior of contractual savings 
institutions may significantly depend on their investments. For instance, they will have 
greater incentive to be active investors in the stock market when they hold a large share 
of their assets in stocks; conversely, explanations favoring corporate governance issues 
are less likely to be relevant in countries in which contractual savings hardly invest in the 
stock market. In order to account for such effects, we define the following variable: 
CSSHFA is defined as the proportion of shares in the portfolio of contractual savings 
institutions; It is likely that the incentive for contractual savings institutions to actively 
monitor on the stock market is positively correlated to CSSHFA. Therefore, this variable 
aims at capturing cross-country and time-series differences in the behavior of these 
institutions.
61 
(4) Empirical Strategy 
We start with simple descriptions of corporate financing choices and contractual savings 
characteristics across countries. We look at the evolution of contractual savings size and 
investments, and we compute simple correlations between the variables. These simple 
statistics show strong correlations between the capital structure variables and the 
contractual savings characteristics. Next, we control for other variables in pooled and 
panel estimates that confirm the initial intuition. Given that we use macroeconomic 
variables in our estimations, firm level data are not appropriate. However, we still want to 
keep some heterogeneity within countries. For this reason, our analysis is conducted at 
two different levels. First, at the country level, by taking the average values of firms’ 
characteristics by country, and for each year.  This gives us 229 observations. We use this 
country-level data set to illustrate our results. Second, we confirm the robustness of the 
results by doing the same analysis at the 2 digit (SIC code) industry level by taking the 
average values of  firms’ characteristics by country,  industry, and per year. Therefore, 
we obtain a panel data set (of approximately 6000 observations) in which the unit is 
industry-country-year. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents the sample of countries that are included in our c ontractual 
savings database, and the total number of firms available for each country. We have data 
for 35 countries, including 13 emerging economies (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Hungary, 
India, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand and 
                                                 
60 Pagano, Panetta and Zingales (1998) show for instance that IPOs  are partly motivated by stock 
overvaluation in the industry in which the firm operates. 
61 In the final set of estimations, we also report  the results obtained with the variable CSSHCAP 
(contractual savings’ equity investments, as a % of stock market capitalization). This variable allows 
instead investigating whether the size of the contractual savings’ stock holdings, relative to stock market 
capitalization, is an important factor.      
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Turkey). The contractual savings data include information on total financial assets and 
portfolio composition for pension funds and insurance companies (in particular corporate 
stocks), except for 6 countries for which we have no information on equity investments 
(Austria, Brazil, France, Japan, Spain, and Turkey). The Worldscope database covers 
mainly large listed firms. Previous works on this database (Claessens et al. (2000)) shows 
that for nine East Asian countries, this sample covers between 64% and 96% of the total 
market capitalization of firms listed on the stock market. We expect that the coverage is 




  Table 2 provides the definition of the variables that we use in our estimations. 
Figure 4a illustrates the spectacular increase
64 in the assets managed by pension funds 
and life-insurance companies,
65 
66 relative to GDP. Expressed in rate of growth, the 
increase is even more impressive. Contractual savings financial assets, relative to GDP, 
have been growing at an average annual rate of growth of 17.7%, 3.4%, 6.9%, 6.0%, 
7.9%, 8.99% and 4.6% respectively in France, Germany, South Africa, the United States, 
the United Kingdom, Chile and Korea. Figure 4b, however, shows that this evolution is 
less spectacular when the size of contractual savings institutions is compared to the size 
of capital markets (bond and stock markets). For a substantial number of countries (10 
out of 29, including the United States), contractual savings’ financial assets increases less 
than the size of capital markets. But this graph highlights another interesting feature: 
most of the countries in which contractual savings have grown relative to the capital 
market are located in the bottom half-sample at the beginning of the period. Conversely, 
contractual savings tend to have grown at a slower pace than the capital markets in the 
countries located in the top half-sample at the beginning of the period. These two groups 
of countries roughly correspond to (1) bank-based economies, or economies with 
underdeveloped financial systems (bottom group), and (2) market-based economies for 
the top group. 
 
Moreover, there has been a widespread tendency to modify the portfolio in favor 
of equity investments (except in Korea, Thailand and Brazil) as shown  by Figure 5a. 
Figure 5b confirms that these changes in the portfolio are roughly reflected in the 
proportion of shares held by contractual savings institutions relative to total stock market 
capitalization. 
 
Globally, these strong time-series movements suggest that we can hope to capture 
not only cross-country variations but also within country differences in financing patterns 
                                                 
62 Luxembourg and Sri Lanka, for which the firm database is limited to a handful of firms, are dropped in 
the panel estimates, for we have only 1 year of observation. 
63 Except in the case of the United States for which the database includes only 417 non-financial firms. We 
decided to restrict the U.S. data to the Worldscope source to be consistent with past studies using this 
database, and avoid mixing data from different sources.   
64 Singapore is the only country in which contractual savings assets decreased relative to GDP. 
65 Musalem and Impavido (2000) show on this sample of countries, that this explosion of contractual 
savings institutions may partly explain the rapid growth of stock markets over the last 15 years. 
66 In France, where pension funds are underdeveloped, the life insurance industry exploded at the beginning 
of the 90s as a result of strong fiscal incentives to save in life-insurance products (these savings were 
exempt of taxes).  
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that may be attributed to the development and investment policies of contractual savings 
institutions.  
 
Table 3 provides simple cross-country comparisons.
67 We report corporate 
financing patterns averaged by country and financial system characteristics. The figures 
show that investment policies of contractual savings institutions vary strongly across 
countries. The top 6 countries for which equity investments are the largest, are all 
classified as market based financial systems by Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1999): 
Australia, Ireland, South Africa, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States. In 
these countries (only South Africa is not part of the developed world), contractual savings 
institutions invest on average 52% of their assets on the stock market in 1997, their 
financial assets corresponds to 92% of GDP, 45% of (long-term) capital markets, and 
their equity investments to 45% of domestic stock market capitalization.  The debt-to-
equity ratio is on average equal to 81% and long-term debt is 65% of total indebtedness.  
At the other end of the spectrum, equity investments are negligible in Sri Lanka, Mexico, 
Singapore, Germany, G reece, and Austria. These countries can be classified in two 
groups: (1) developed economies, with bank-based financial systems (Germany, Austria 
and Greece), and (2) developing economies with market-based financial systems
68 (Sri 
Lanka, Mexico and Singapore). In these countries, contractual savings institutions invest 
no more than 3.3% of their financial assets on the stock market in 1997. These assets 
represent only 28% of GDP and 25.8% of long-term capital markets; if we drop 
Singapore,
69 the last figure falls to 15%. And their equity holdings are on average 2.75% 
of stock market capitalization. The average debt to equity ratio and debt maturity are 
respectively 98% and 44%.  
 
At this stage, the only clear picture that seems to emerge is that the size and 
investment behavior of contractual savings institutions seems to be strongly correlated 
with the financial structure of the economy. Developed economies with market-based 
financial systems have large contractual savings (in term of GDP and Capital Markets)  
that invest significantly on the stock exchange, whereas contractual savings institutions 
tend to have more conservative investment policies
70 in developed economies with bank-
based economies or in developing economies.  
 
In Figure 6 we plot the debt-equity ratio and the debt maturity against the size of 
contractual savings (expressed in percentage of GDP). The first figure indicates that the 
level of development of contractual savings institutions seems to be negatively correlated 
with firms’ leverage. The second figure suggests that there is a positive correlation 
between debt-maturity and contractual savings’ size. Figure 7 repeats the same exercise 
with the allocation of contractual savings’ assets. Again equity investments by 
institutional investors seem to be an indicator of the ability of firms to reduce their 
leverage and to increase the maturity of their debt.  
                                                 
67 In the case of Ireland, the contractual savings figures are for 1995. 
68 Mexico and Sri Lanka have  underdeveloped financial systems. 
69 In Singapore, until recently, most resources of contractual savings institutions (in particular the large 
national provident fund) had  to be invested in special non-marketable government securities. 
70 Resulting either from  “tradition” (as in Germany) or strong restrictions (as in Singapore).  
26 
 
Table 4 displays pairwise correlations among the main variables. Leverage is 
strongly negatively correlated to the level of development of contractual savings 
institutions (relative to GDP and relative to the size of capital markets). It is also strongly 
negatively correlated with the proportion of financial assets held in equity.  Debt maturity 
is strongly and positively correlated with the level of development of contractual savings 
institutions (for the two variables), and with the proportion of financial assets held in 
equity. Furthermore, the contractual savings variables seem to be slightly better 
indicators of the corporate financing patterns than the standard financial systems 
characteristics. 
 
These simple statistics neither account for firms’ characteristics, nor allow one to 
conclude that the correlations are not the result of the correlation with stock market and 
banks characteristics.  In the next section, we provide a simple econometric analysis that 
confirms that the correlation between firms’ financing patterns and the activity of 
institutional investors is not merely a function of firms’ characteristics and other 
macroeconomic factors. 
5.2 Regression Results 
(1) The strategy 
We investigate the relationship between the development of contractual savings 
institutions and corporate financing patterns, after controlling for firms’ characteristics, 
macroeconomic factors and standard financial system characteristics. In each case, we 
report pooled
71 and within estimations. While endogeneity may be an issue in this type of 
analysis in general,
72 in our case the simultaneity bias can be expected to be lower for 
several reasons.  
 
The size and characteristics of the financial system may indeed evolve to respond 
to the aggregate demand of capital by the corporate sector and the public sector. 
Although each firm takes the size and activity of the banking sector and capital markets 
as given, the aggregate decisions of firms affect the size of the financial institutions. 
Moreover, shocks affect the financial sector and the corporate sector simultaneously. For 
instance, an unexpected good news on profit opportunities will increase the demand for 
external finance by firms, and banks will also tend to offer more loans. Hence it will 
increase simultaneously the size of the banking sector and firms’ indebtedness. In the 
case of contractual savings, however, it seems more difficult to expect that their size is 
significantly affected by firms’ demand for capital, unless one is willing to argue that 
pension contributions and insurance premia are significantly affected by the current 
business environment. As already noted however, endogeneity may arise because the 
value of contractual savings assets will move with stock market capitalization. We 
provide three controls for this source of simultaneity bias. First, firms’ net worth are 
                                                 
71 In the pooled regressions, we include dummy variables for the countries having a book reserve system 
(Korea, Austria, Italy, Germany) or centrally managed provident funds (Malaysia, Singapore). 
72 See Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) for a 2 stage least square treatment of endogeneity of the 
banking sector size in a similar approach.  
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measured at their book value; second, the variable CSFAMKT should in principle 
partially correct for those price movements; finally, the stock market capitalization 
variable should also capture the effects of such price movements. Portfolio decisions will, 
of course, depend on the relative returns of the different assets; for this reason, the asset 
allocation of pension funds may be endogenous. However, we expect this endogeneity 
problem to be limited because (1) price movements affecting the corporate financing 
patterns should be captured in the stock market capitalization variable; (2) investment 
regulations may be binding, especially in developing countries;
73 and in many developed 
economies, implicit limits or strong (conservative) asset management traditions may be 
as important as relative returns in determining the allocation of assets;
74 (3) the results of 
Impavido and Musalem (2000) suggests that contractual savings development and asset 
allocation have had an exogenous impact on capital markets development over the period 
studied. 
 
(2) Institutional Investors and Firms’ Financing Patterns 
First, firms’ characteristics are averaged by country, which provides an 
unbalanced panel. We regress each of the leverage variable on the three sets of control 
variables, and then plot the unexplained residuals against the total financial assets of 
contractual savings, in percentage of GDP (Figures 5a, b and c). These OLS regressions 
confirm that the correlation between firms’ capital structure and the development of 
contractual savings institutions remains significant after controlling for other potential 
explanatory variables. The correlation is not accounted for by firms’ characteristics  (such 
as the maturity of assets, profitability, risk or potential agency costs), macroeconomic 
factors (inflation, level of development, etc.), or banking sector and stock market size and 
liquidity.  
 
The results of pooled cross-country and cross-industry regressions (Table 5a) lead 
to the same conclusion. After controlling for firms’ characteristics averaged by industries 
in each country, for macroeconomic factors, and for financial system characteristics, the 
level of development of contractual savings institutions is negatively correlated with 
leverage and positively correlated with the maturity of debt. Moreover, it is positively 
correlated with debt maturity. Further inspection of the table shows that the coefficients 
on firms’ characteristics are consistent with what we expected. Firms are more indebted 
and have more long-term debt when net fixed assets represent a larger share of total 
assets. Larger sales relative to total assets imply more debt and more short-term debt. 
More profitable firms tend to be less indebted, and growth firms have less long-term debt 
relative to total debt. Finally, riskier firms have a lower maturity of debt. The size of the 
banking sector is positively correlated to firms’ leverage and negatively to the debt  
maturity. This second point is consistent with the result of Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic(1999). As expected, the stock market capitalization is negatively correlated 
to leverage. It is also positively correlated to the debt maturity. One explanation 
sometimes proposed for this effect is that there are informational spillovers from the 
                                                 
73 See for instance Srinivas, Whitehouse and Yermo (1999). 
74 For instance, in the case of Germany, it seems difficult to attribute the 2.77% of equity in total financial 
assets to low stock returns relative to other assets.  
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stock market, which reduces the asymmetries of information, hence increasing the supply 
of long-term debt. 
 
Our results are however not robust to the inclusion of unobserved fixed effects at 
the industry level in each country. In Table 5b, we perform the same regressions by using 
the variable CSFAMKT.
75 The results suggests the previous variable CSFAGDP indeed 
introduces a spurious correlation (as discussed before) between the level of development 
of contractual savings and leverage. Now, leverage is positively correlated with the level 
of development of contractual savings. However, as suggested by the regressions on 
LTDTE and LTDTD, the mechanism seems to go through an increase in long-term debt 
relative to equity and long term debt relative to short-term debt.  
 
Overall, these two sets of regressions tend to support the hypothesis of a global 
impact of contractual savings development on leverage.  Moreover, the development 
contractual savings institutions seems to foster the use of long-term debt. 
 
The absence of a strongly robust effect on the whole sample should not be totally 
surprising given  that contractual savings institutions, as we showed in the previous 
paragraph, have extremely different investment behaviors from one country to another. 
We should expect a fall in leverage when contractual savings develop only if the cost of 
equity finance falls, which happens if the aggregate supply of equity increases (or for 
other reasons listed in Section 4). How contractual savings institutions invest their 
resources should have a crucial impact. The next result confirms this hypothesis. 
 
In Table 6,  we look at the impact of contractual savings portfolio choices on 
corporate financial decisions. We obtain a strong and economically significant effect on 
leverage. An increase in the proportion of financial assets invested in shares is associated 
with a decrease in corporate leverage. It leads also to a decrease in short-term debt 
relative to equity. This is robust to unobserved industries fixed effects. This set of results 
is consistent with the claim that the investment behavior of contractual savings 
institutions matters for corporate financing patterns. Their investment decisions have a 
significant impact on firms’ capital structure. This last result strongly suggests that (1) 
any attempt to understand cross and within country variations in corporate financing 
patterns needs to assess the role of non-bank financial intermediaries such as institutional 
investors. (2) Policy interventions that remove binding constraints on portfolios will have 
sizeable effects on the corporate sector financing patterns.
76 T he coefficients of the 
pooled and within estimates imply that if Korean contractual savings institutions had had 
the same investment behavior as in South Africa (where contractual savings are investing 
44% of their financial assets in shares on average over the period, compared to 12% in 
Korea), the debt equity ratio of Korean firms would have decreased from 4.9 to 4.6 in the 
pessimistic case, or to 3.9 in the optimistic case, hence a decrease between 6% and 20%. 
 
                                                 
75 We ran the regressions with CSSHCAP, with very similar results (not reported here). 




However, the channels through which contractual savings institutions affect the 
corporate financing decisions cannot be disentangled on the basis of this first cross-
country analysis; moreover, as suggested by our descriptive statistics, we may capture 
cross-country differences in their overall financial structure (although such an argument  
cannot explain our fixed-effects results). The results displayed in the next section 
enlighten the channels through which contractual savings institutions affect corporate 
financing choices. They provide a basis for better targeted policy interventions. 
(3) Financial Structure and Financial Channels 
We use the classification of macroeconomic financial structures developed by 
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1999). Countries are divided into two sub-groups (see Table 
2): (1) economies with bank-based financial structures, (2) economies with market-based 
financial structures. This classification has been constructed by using a large set of 
indicators for size, activity, and efficiency of the banking sector and the stock market. It 
provides a rough evaluation on whether savings are channeled to productive activities 
mainly through the banking system or the stock market.
77 This is therefore a relevant 
classification for our purposes: in market-based economies, for instance, the contractual 
savings industry accounts for 46.3% of long-term capital markets size, equity investments 
are 30.7% of total financial assets and 29% of stock market capitalization; in bank-based 
economies, the same figures are respectively 22.3%, 12.3% and 12.2%. Therefore, the 
contractual savings industry is less developed in countries classified as bank-based than 
in market-based countries. Moreover, pension funds and life insurance companies invest 
significantly less on the stock market in bank-based economies than in market-based 
economies.  
 
Although we have no information on the maturity of debt instruments held by 
contractual savings institutions (except for 4 countries), we are able to break their assets 
between the two categories: (1) bills and bonds (henceafter BB), (2) loans (henceafter 
LL), for a significant number of countries. In market-based economies, BB represents 
42.6% of total financial assets and LL only 13.9%. In bank-based economies, the same 
figures are respectively 45% and 31.6%. It seems therefore that, on average, the lower 
equity investments in bank-based economies are mostly explained by a higher proportion 
of loans in their portfolio.  
 
The relative importance of pension funds and life insurance companies differs in 
the two groups of countries. Pension funds account on average for 30% and 20.4% of 
total contractual savings financial assets respectively in market-based and bank-based 
economies. In particular, Anglo-saxon and continental Europe exhibit strongly different 
contractual savings industries. Pension funds hold 70%, 54% and 50% of contractual 
savings financial assets in respectively the United States, the United Kingdom and 
Australia. In Germany, Italy and France the figures are 12%, 37%, and less than 1%.  
 
                                                 
77 A recent paper by Beck et al. (2000) show that the financial structure does not explain economic growth 
and the reliance on external financing after controlling for the level of financial development. Our results 
are not contradictory: we show that this classification does help to identify different channels through 
which corporate financing choices are affected by the development of contractual savings institutions.   
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In Figures 9 a-b we display the conditional correlation between leverage and 
respectively contractual savings size and asset allocation in a pooled regression at the 
country level. After controlling for firms’ characteristics, macroeconomic factors and 
bank and stock market size, a significant correlation remains between leverage and 
contractual savings size (Figure 9a). Contractual savings development has however a 
different impact on leverage in market-based or bank-based economies. In countries in 
which the stock market is the core of the financial system, the development of pension 
funds and insurance companies leads to a decrease in leverage. In bank-based financial 
systems the opposite effect seems to dominate: the development of contractual savings 
implies an increase in leverage. Figure 9b shows that the proportion of equity investments 
in the  portfolio is negatively correlated to leverage in market-based financial systems 
whereas it seems to have no significant effect on leverage in bank-based economies. 
 
Figure 11 plots the unexplained residuals of a pooled regression at the country 
level of debt maturity against contractual savings size. Again, the impact of contractual 
savings development is strikingly different in bank-based economies and in market-based 
economies. In the latter, the development of contractual savings institutions implies a 
decrease in debt maturity, whereas in the former it implies an increase in the debt 
maturity. 
 
The industry level analysis (see Table 7) confirms the results obtained at the 
country level.
78  We report the coefficient on the contractual savings variable and its 
significance for each sub-group of countries. In market-based economies, there is a 
strongly significant impact of contractual savings portfolio choices on firms’ financing 
patterns: an increase in equity investments by contractual savings leads to a decline in 
leverage, for our three variables. The effect is robust to unobserved industry specific 
fixed effects within countries; and it is economically large. The impact of contractual 
savings development is somewhat weaker, although it affects leverage in a similar way. 
Debt maturity is also negatively correlated either to the level of development of 
contractual savings or the proportion of share investments in the portfolios of contractual 
savings. These results are consistent with the intuition. As contractual savings are large in 
these countries on average, it is likely that their marginal effect on firms’ financing 
patterns go through their investment choices rather than through an increase in their 
size.
79 As they increase their equity holdings, firms tend to substitute equity finance for 
debt finance. These results suggest that banks and institutional investors are indirect 
competitors. The fall in the maturity of debt may be partly attributed to the fact that banks 
concentrate on their core activity, which is short-term lending.  
 
In the case of bank-based economies, the channels through which firms’ capital 
structures are affected are noticeably different. The dominant effect  is the level of 
development of the contractual savings industry, while the asset allocation hardly affects 
                                                 
78 We ran the regression by moving Korea from the market-based subgroup to the bank-based one; results 
are essentially the same. 
79 More precisely, it seems that the characteristics of contractual savings portfolio are more important than 




firms’ capital structures (still we find evidence of a positive impact on the maturity of 
debt). The no-correlation result with the portfolio variable makes sense: as contractual 
savings investment in equity is no more than 12% of stock market capitalization, a 
change in their behavior (measured by CSSHFA) is very unlikely to affect significantly 
the aggregate corporate financing choices.   
 
 The level of development of the contractual savings industry has a strong positive 
effect on leverage and a positive effect on the maturity of debt. These results suggest that 
the channel through which contractual savings affect the corporate financing patterns 
does not go through the stock market.  Indeed, contractual savings development is 
associated with an increase in debt finance  – and an increase in debt maturity. As 
explained above, it is very unlikely that this can be explained by higher investments in 
bonds in bank-based economies than in market-based economies. Rather the explanation 
must be related to loans; either (1) they lend directly to the productive sector; (2) they are 
complementary to the banking sector. More specifically, by reducing the illiquidity risk 
in the banking system, they may increase the incentive to banks to increase long-term 
loans in proportion of total loans. A study at the bank level should give additional 
insights on which of these mechanisms dominate. 
6. Conclusion 
 
We show that t he development of contractual savings institutions and their 
investment behavior have a significant on firms’ financing patterns across and within 
countries. Contractual savings institutions have a comparative advantage in supplying 
long-term finance to the corporate sector. In market-based economies, their development 
and investment behavior leads to a decrease in firms’ leverage. In bank-based financial 
systems, the development of contractual savings institutions leads to an increase in the 
maturity of debt. These results suggest that there is an efficiency gain at the firm level: 
increasing the array of external financing possibilities is associated with increased 
maturity of firms’ liabilities, which suggests that when contractual savings institutions are 
underdeveloped, firms cannot obtain enough long-term finance. Increased maturity of the 
corporate sector liabilities should increase its resilience to various shocks (such as 
refinancing risks and bankruptcy risks). The impact goes through several possible 
channels; in market-based economies, the main effect seems to go through the stock 
market and equity finance. In bank-based economies, it seems to go through the supply of 
loans. More analysis is however needed to identify the precise channels through which 
contractual savings institutions interact with the financial system. In particular, 
regulations aiming at strengthening corporate governance are more likely to have a 
sizeable impact in market-based economies; in bank-based economies, the focus should 
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Size Financial Assets Portfolio Composition Financial Assets Portfolio Composition Financial Assets Portfolio Composition
1 ARGENTINA 40 Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
2 AUSTRALIA 217 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
3 AUSTRIA 91 Yes No Yes No Yes No
4 BELGIUM 111 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
5 BRAZIL 149 Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
6 CANADA 538 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
7 CHILE 74 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
8 DENMARK 165 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
9 FINLAND 124 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
10 FRANCE 753 Yes No Yes No Yes No
11 GERMANY 749 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
12 GREECE 151 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
13 HUNGARY 27 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
14 INDIA 315 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
15 IRELAND 68 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
16 ITALY 165 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
17 JAPAN 2189 Yes No Yes No Yes No
18 KOREA (SOUTH) 258 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
19 LUXEMBOURG* 9 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
20 MALAYSIA 336 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
21 MEXICO 83 Yes Yes Yes No No No
22 NETHERLANDS 203 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
23 NEW ZEALAND 48 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
24 NORWAY 175 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
25 PORTUGAL 80 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
26 SINGAPORE 174 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
27 SOUTH AFRICA 210 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
28 SPAIN 145 Yes No Yes No Yes No
29 SRI LANKA** 12 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
30 SWEDEN 248 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
31 SWITZERLAND 179 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
32 THAILAND 210 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
33 TURKEY 64 Yes No Yes No Yes No
34 UNITED KINGDOM 1650 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
35 UNITED STATES 417 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
* : 1995 only, dropped in Panel Estimates
** : 1997 only, dropped in Panel Estimates




Table 2: Definition of Variables 
VARIABLE DEFINITION
Firms ' Characteristics
Leverage (TDTE) Total Debt Over Book Value of Equity
Leverage (STDTE) Short-term Debt over Book Value of Equity
Leverage (LTDTE) Long-term Debt over Book Value of Equity
Debt Matuity (LTDTD) Long-term Debt over Total Debt
Debt Maturity (STDTD) Short-term Debt over Total Debt
Growth Opportunities ( Market Value of Equity + Total Debt ) / ( Book value of Equity + Total Debt )
( Tobin's Q )
Net Fixed Assets (%) Net Fixed Assets / Total Assets
Net Sales (%) Net Sales / Total Assets
Size Ln ( Net Sales ) ( constant US $ )
Profitability [ 1 + ( EBIT / Total Assets ) ] / [ 1 + CPI inflation ] - 1
Volatility of Earnings St. Dev. (EBIT) / Abs ( Mean (EBIT) )
Macroeconomic Factors
Cost of Equity ( 1 + g ) / ( P/E ) where g is the average rate of growth of earnings over the period and P/E the closing P/E 
Inflation Consumer Price Index Rate of Growth
Real Interest rate Lending Interest Rate adjusted for inflation (World Development Indicators)
Volatility of Inflation St. Dev. (Inflation) / abs(mean(inflation))
Log(GDP/cap) Ln ( GDP/capita) (constant US $)
Financial System Development
Credit to Private Sector (ec2) Credit to Private Sector by Financial Intermediaries ( % GDP)
Stock Market Capitalization (ec12) Stock Market Capitalization ( % GDP )
Stock Market Liquidity (ec19) Value Traded ( % GDP )
Turnover Ratio (TOR) Value Traded ( % Capitalization )
Contractual Savings Insitutions
CS Development (% GDP) Pension Funds + Life Insurance* Total Financial Assets ( % GDP )
(csfaGDP)
CS Development (% Sec Mkt) Pension Funds + Life Insurance* Total Financial Assets 
(csfamkt) ( %  Stock Market Capitalization + Total Outstanding Debt on Domestic Debt Markets )
CS Portfolio Allocation Shares, % Financial Assets
(csshfa)
( Pension Funds + Life Insurance* )
CS Shares (% CAP) Pension Funds + Life Insurance * Shares ( % Stock Market Capitalization)
(csshCAP)
CS Shares (% GDP) Pension Funds + Life Insurance * Shares ( % GDP)
(csshGDP)
Dummy Variables
Book Reserve System = 1 for Germany, Austria, Italy and South Korea, 0 otherwise.
Centrally Managed  =1 for Singapore and Malaysia, 0 otherwise.
* : Life and Non Life Insurance for Argentina and Mexico 
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Figure 4: Contractual Savings Size  
Evolution 1990-1997 
 






Argentina: 1994-1998 (pension funds + insurance companies) 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Japan, Norway, Singapore, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey: 1996 instead of 1997. 































































































































































































































































































Argentina: 1994-1998 (pension funds + insurance companies) 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Japan, Korea, Norway, Singapore, Sweden, 





















Figure 5: Contractual Savings Portfolio Allocation  
Evolution 1990-1997 
 
-  (a) Shares, % Financial Assets  







Argentina: 1994-1997 (pension funds + insurance companies) 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, India, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, Sweden, 




















































Argentina: 1994-1997 (pension funds + insurance companies) 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, India, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, Sweden, 






Mexico: 1997-1999 (pension funds only) 



































country year tdte ltdte stdebtte ltdtd ec2 ec12 ec19 TOR csfaGDP csshfa csfamkt csshGDP csshCAP
% % % % % % % % %
ARGENTINA 1997 0.75 0.27 0.48 0.40 19.54 18.23 7.91 43.38 4.23 19.32 10.02 0.82 4.48
AUSTRALIA 1997 0.59 0.46 0.14 0.71 80.59 177.03 79.00 44.62 65.87 55.88 29.86 36.81 20.79
AUSTRIA 1996 1.10 1.29 0.57 0.46 103.15 17.32 11.94 68.95 21.35 5.30 27.34 1.13 6.53
BELGIUM 1996 1.29 0.78 0.51 0.49 67.44 56.48 12.25 21.69 27.20 24.48 13.77 6.66 11.79
BRAZIL 1997 2.27 1.29 0.99 0.50 30.76 31.14 24.78 79.56 1.94 NA 2.70 NA NA
CANADA 1997 0.75 0.61 0.14 0.73 91.79 93.40 58.51 62.64 68.87 22.93 38.79 15.79 16.91
CHILE 1997 1.11 0.68 0.43 0.55 61.53 93.47 9.66 10.33 52.86 20.16 NA 10.66 11.40
DENMARK 1996 0.73 0.45 0.28 0.59 32.16 55.14 27.57 49.99 54.56 29.66 27.89 16.18 29.35
FINLAND 1996 0.88 0.65 0.23 0.65 54.51 61.19 30.35 49.60 48.95 19.80 42.73 9.69 15.84
FRANCE 1997 2.61 1.24 1.54 0.50 80.77 48.43 29.12 60.13 44.08 NA 34.54 NA NA
GERMANY 1997 1.23 0.69 0.57 0.53 108.71 39.44 49.19 124.71 25.14 2.77 20.64 0.70 1.76
GREECE 1997 0.79 0.22 0.57 0.24 35.79 29.59 17.63 59.57 14.35 5.30 14.15 0.76 2.57
HUNGARY 1996 0.56 0.29 0.27 0.32 22.31 32.75 16.80 51.31 2.83 7.11 6.27 0.20 0.61
INDIA 1997 0.23 0.12 0.11 0.53 30.50 23.28 12.82 55.08 9.49 7.95 35.97 0.75 3.24
IRELAND 1997 1.03 0.76 0.26 0.59 81.75 32.17 20.22 62.85 63.05 52.55 75.33 33.13 82.90
ITALY 1997 2.44 1.20 1.24 0.47 51.46 30.09 17.30 57.52 12.20 10.89 7.69 1.33 4.42
JAPAN 1996 1.81 0.91 0.90 0.48 201.14 52.90 29.87 56.47 47.73 NA 27.99 NA NA
KOREA (SOUTH) 1997 3.28 1.54 1.74 0.47 85.30 9.46 38.55 407.32 26.28 10.58 67.54 2.78 29.39
LUXEMBOURG 1995 1.37 0.95 0.41 0.63 100.49 176.06 1.18 6.00 55.86 9.17 NA 5.12 2.91
MALAYSIA 1993 1.22 0.54 0.67 0.46 160.97 95.06 149.32 157.08 50.25 7.02 12.27 3.53 3.71
MEXICO 1997 0.76 0.54 0.21 0.67 15.32 38.86 13.06 33.62 1.40 0.00 NA 0.00 0.00
NETHERLANDS 1997 1.22 0.72 0.49 0.57 112.20 130.10 79.07 60.77 169.44 31.65 87.74 53.62 41.21
NEW ZEALAND 1997 0.67 0.56 0.11 0.78 100.62 140.13 38.17 27.24 26.42 36.49 15.81 9.64 6.88
NORWAY 1996 0.80 0.66 0.14 0.73 77.46 43.36 30.27 69.80 30.02 15.04 38.22 4.51 10.41
PORTUGAL 1997 0.76 0.38 0.37 0.50 76.13 38.14 20.49 53.74 16.19 16.21 17.44 2.63 6.88
SINGAPORE 1996 0.62 0.32 0.31 0.43 112.89 110.38 66.40 60.15 93.50 5.67 42.20 5.30 4.80
SOUTH AFRICA 1997 0.36 0.22 0.15 0.51 135.74 179.77 34.78 19.34 125.01 46.64 NA 58.31 32.43
SPAIN 1997 1.02 0.47 0.55 0.46 80.75 54.58 85.15 156.01 20.60 NA 18.02 NA NA
SRI LANKA 1997 1.40 0.58 0.82 0.31 24.13 13.89 2.06 14.84 16.75 0.71 NA 0.12 0.85
SWEDEN 1996 0.75 0.61 0.15 0.76 40.91 119.81 77.39 64.60 47.96 42.27 22.68 20.28 16.92
SWITZERLAND 1996 0.93 0.61 0.32 0.64 168.88 225.39 193.88 86.02 131.38 18.87 64.47 24.79 11.00
THAILAND 1997 4.14 2.65 1.50 0.40 129.81 15.29 15.02 98.22 5.71 10.04 NA 0.57 3.75
TURKEY 1995 2.07 0.63 1.43 0.34 18.49 12.27 30.35 247.41 0.33 NA 1.06 NA NA
UNITED KINGDOM 1997 1.30 0.66 0.63 0.54 123.86 155.17 64.45 41.53 147.81 65.23 68.55 96.42 62.14
UNITED STATES 1997 0.85 0.66 0.19 0.81 126.77 144.35 130.41 90.34 104.57 50.34 34.18 52.64 36.47 
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country Legal origin Bank-based Market-based Low Developed Antidirector rights
ARGENTINA F 0 0 1 (B) 4
AUSTRALIA CL 0 1 0 4
AUSTRIA G 1 0 0 2
BELGIUM F 1 0 0 0
BRAZIL F 0 0 1 (M) 3
Canada CL 0 1 0 5
CHILE F 0 0 1 (C) 5
DENMARK SC 0 0 1 (M) 2
FINLAND SC 1 0 0 3
France F 1 0 0 3
GERMANY G 1 0 0 1
GREECE F 0 0 1 (B) 2
HUNGARY G 0 0 1 (.) 3
INDIA CL 0 0 1 (B) 5
IRELAND CL 0 0 1 (B) 4
ITALY F 1 0 0 1
JAPAN G 1 0 0 4
KOREA (SOUTH) G 0 1 0 2
MALAYSIA CL 0 1 0 3
MEXICO F 0 0 1 (M) 1
NETHERLANDS F 0 1 0 2
NEW ZEALAND CL 1 0 0 4
NORWAY SC 1 0 0 4
Portugal F 1 0 0 3
SINGAPORE CL 0 1 0 4
SOUTH AFRICA CL 0 1 0 5
SPAIN F 1 0 0 4
SRI LANKA CL 0 0 1 (B) 3
SWEDEN SC 0 1 0 3
SWITZERLAND G 0 1 0 2
THAILAND F 0 1 0 2
TURKEY F 0 0 1 (M) 2
UNITED KINGDOM CL 0 1 0 5
UNITED STATES CL 0 1 0 5
F: French Origin, G: German Origin, SC: Scandinavian Origin, CL: Common Law
B : Bank-based, M: Market-based financial systems 
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Figure 6: Capital Structures  
and Contractual Savings Development (% GDP) 
 









































































































































Figure 7: Capital Structures and Contractual Savings Portfolio 
 





































































































































Table 4:  Pairwise Correlations 
 
 
|     tdte stdebtte    ltdte    ltdtd    stdtd      ec2     ec12 
-----------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
tdte    |   1.0000  
              | 
              | 
stdebtte   |   0.8124   1.0000  
              |   0.0000 
              | 
ltdte     |   0.6112   0.2823   1.0000  
              |   0.0000   0.0000 
              | 
ltdtd     |  -0.0005  -0.1794   0.1522   1.0000  
              |   0.9611   0.0000   0.0000 
              | 
stdtd    |   0.0005   0.1794  -0.1522  -1.0000   1.0000  
              |   0.9611   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000 
              | 
ec2    |   0.0380   0.0251   0.0297   0.0140  -0.0140   1.0000  
              |   0.0005   0.0223   0.0068   0.2050   0.2050 
              | 
ec12    |  -0.0933  -0.0813  -0.0603  -0.0252   0.0252   0.4370   1.0000  
              |   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0222   0.0222   0.0000 
              | 
TOR    |  -0.0207  -0.0142  -0.0141   0.0327  -0.0327  -0.2050  -0.1184  
              |   0.0586   0.1951   0.1982   0.0030   0.0030   0.0000   0.0000 
              | 
ec19    |  -0.0398  -0.0286  -0.0264  -0.0067   0.0067   0.3788   0.7398  
              |   0.0003   0.0091   0.0159   0.5432   0.5432   0.0000   0.0000 
              | 
csfaGDP  |  -0.1127  -0.1229  -0.0514   0.1318  -0.1318   0.3597   0.6694  
              |   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000 
              | 
csfamkt  |  -0.0536  -0.0871  -0.0053   0.1319  -0.1319   0.2627   0.3322  
              |   0.0000   0.0000   0.6727   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000 
              | 
csshfa    |  -0.1004  -0.1034  -0.0544   0.1061  -0.1061   0.3349   0.4372  
              |   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000 
              | 
csshCAP  |  -0.0690  -0.0908  -0.0277   0.1028  -0.1028   0.1801   0.1816  
              |   0.0000   0.0000   0.0371   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000  
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              | 
csshGDP  |  -0.1117  -0.0991  -0.0648   0.0155  -0.0155   0.4178   0.5211  
              |   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.2472   0.2472   0.0000   0.0000 
              | 
LnGDPcap  |   0.0429   0.0141   0.0450   0.1219  -0.1219   0.3307   0.0012  
              |   0.0001   0.1947   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.9141 
              | 
 
 
              |      TOR     ec19  csfaGDP  csfamkt   csshfa  csshCAP  csshGDP 
-----------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
TOR    |   1.0000  
              | 
              | 
ec19    |  -0.0535   1.0000  
              |   0.0000 
              | 
csfaGDP  |  -0.1268   0.4301   1.0000  
              |   0.0000   0.0000 
              | 
csfamkt  |  -0.0707   0.2244   0.8465   1.0000  
              |   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000 
              | 
csshfa    |  -0.1177   0.1727   0.5776   0.4521   1.0000  
              |   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000 
              | 
csshCAP  |   0.0515   0.0634   0.5721   0.6425   0.8230   1.0000  
              |   0.0001   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000 
              | 
csshGDP  |  -0.1671   0.2465   0.7642   0.5970   0.8908   0.8105   1.0000  
              |   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000 
              | 
LnGDPcap  |  -0.6971   0.0841   0.1888   0.1781   0.1286   0.0411  -0.0510  














Figure 8: Leverage and Contractual Savings Development  
- Conditional Correlation - 
 























Regression line: Residual = - 0.50 * (CS Financial Assets, % GDP) (t-stat = -4.06) 




Values are the unexplained residuals of leverage plotted against Contractual Savings 
Financial Assets (% GDP). The control variables are : 
(1) Firms’ Characteristics, 
(2) Macroeconomic Factors, 
(3) Financial System Development Variables, 
(4) Book reserve  system and Centrally Managed Pension Funds dummies. 






































































Regression line: Residual = - 0.25 * (CS Financial Assets, % GDP) (t-stat = -2.69) 





Values are the unexplained residuals of leverage plotted against Contractual Savings 
Financial Assets (% GDP). The control variables are : 
(1) Firms’ Characteristics, 
(2) Macroeconomic Factors, 
(3) Financial System Development Variables, 
(4) Book reserve  system and Centrally Managed Pension Funds dummies. 








































































Regression line: Residual = - 0.24 * (CS Financial Assets, % GDP) (t-stat = -3.84) 






Values are the unexplained residuals of leverage plotted against Contractual Savings 
Financial Assets (% GDP). The control variables are : 
(1) Firms’ Characteristics, 
(2) Macroeconomic Factors, 
(3) Financial System Development Variables, 
(4) Book reserve  system and Centrally Managed Pension Funds dummies. 













































Table 5: Contractual Savings Institutions Development and Firms’ 
Capital Structures 
 
(a) Financial Assets, % GDP 
 
 
Pooled and Panel Estimates
Dependent Variables : Total Debt/Equity Long-Term Debt/Equity Short-Term Debt/Equity Long-Term Debt/ Total Debt
Pooled Within Pooled Within Pooled Within Pooled Within
Explanatory Variables :
Firms' Characteristics :
Growth opportunities 0.002 -0.016 -0.013 -0.023 0.026 0.01 -0.004*** -0.003***
(0.1) (-0.65) (-1.08) (-1.15) (0.99) (0.69) (-3.98) (-2.57)
Net Fixed Assets (%) 0.58*** 0.43*** 0.54*** 0.56*** 0.035 -0.11*** 0.02*** 0.014***
(6.19) (10.98) (5.47) (16.87) (1.04) (-4.95) (5.86) (7.57)
Net Sales (%) 0.015*** 0.017*** -0.0004 -0.001 0.014*** 0.018*** -0.0006*** -0.00038**
(2.62) (4.2) (-0.31) (-0.44) (2.62) (7.67) (-3.18) (-1.92)
Size 0.13*** 0.031 -0.008 -0.29*** 0.0597*** 0.06 0.027*** 0.0018
(5.94) (0.37) (-0.10) (-4.23) (5.55) (1.21) (13.58) (0.43)
Profitability -0.07 -0.17*** -0.036*** -0.05 -0.036 -0.11*** -0.001 0.0014
(-1.21) (-3.75) (-2.27) (-1.38) (-0.66) (-4.29) (-0.43) (0.64)
Volatility of Earnings -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 0.0005 0.0003 -0.0012***
(-0.89) (-0.66) (-0.68) (-1.06) (-0.76) (0.16) (0.83) (-4.86)
Macroeconomic  Factors :
Cost of Equity 0.77 -0.13 0.76** -0.031 0.16 -0.026 -0.041* -0.045**
(1.46) (-0.32) (1.84) (-0.09) (0.75) (-0.11) (-1.90) (-2.35)
Inflation -0.04*** -0.004 -0.029*** 0.004 -0.014*** -0.058 -0.0028*** -0.0002
(-3.14) (-0.17) (-2.96) (0.21) (-2.86) (-0.42) (-2.36) (-0.21)
Real Lending Interest Rate  -0.047*** 0.037* 0.006 0.023 -0.044*** 0.019 0.002*** -0.0021**
(Short-Term) (-2.90) (1.77) (0.48) (1.31) (-4.27) (1.53) (1.86) (-2.08)
Volatility of Inflation 0.04*** 0.013 0.021*** 0.002 0.02*** 0.012 -0.006 -0.001
(3.13) (0.25) (2.13) (0.05) (3.24) (0.40) (-1.40) (-0.41)
Log (GDP/Capita) -0.13* -0.19 0.06 0.18 -0.15*** -0.034 0.07*** 0.0078
(-1.70) (-0.62) (0.81) (0.68) (-4.93) (-0.18) (12.5) (0.52)
Financial System Development :
Credit to Private Sector  0.006*** 0.009*** 0.0038*** 0.0058** 0.0033*** 0.0032 -0.0008*** -0.00038**
(4.57) (2.54) (2.99) (1.82) (5.00) (1.40) (-11.03) (-2.04)
Stock Market Capitalization -0.0067*** -0.004** -0.003*** -0.0026** -0.003*** -0.002** 0.0006*** 0.00008
(-5.14) (-2.47) (-3.27) (-1.91) (-7.03) (-2.10) (5.98) (0.96)
Stock Market Liquidity -0.32** 0.005 -0.02 0.007 0.0008 -0.005 0.003
(Turnover Ratio) (-1.88) (0.34) (-0.15) (0.58) (0.09) (-0.54) (0.48)
Contractual Savings Development -0.45*** 0.36 -0.13* 0.18 -0.27*** 0.29 0.023** -0.0032
( financial assets, % GDP) (-4.68) (0.76) (-1.72) (0.46) (-5.94) (1.02) (2.21) (-0.14)
Dummy Variables :
Sector - country ( 2 digit SIC code)  . Yes . Yes . Yes . Yes
Book Reserve System 1.03*** . 0.3 . 0.96*** . -0.07*** .
(4.28) (1.04) (4.95) (-6.40)
Centrally Managed Pension Funds -0.13 . -0.16* . -0.028 . -0.20*** .
(-1.25) (-1.79) (-0.56) (-11.74)
Adjusted R-squared 0.096 0.04 0.05 0.024 0.087 0.019 0.18 0.023
Nb of Observations 6728 6728 6728 6728 6728 6728 6658 6658
Nb of Cross-Section Units . 1046 . 1046 . 1046 . 1039












Pooled and Panel Estimates
Dependent Variables : Total Debt/Equity Long-Term Debt/Equity Short-Term Debt/Equity Long-Term Debt/ Total Debt
Pooled Within Pooled Within Pooled Within Pooled Within
Explanatory Variables :
Firms' Characteristics :
Growth opportunities 0.0026 -0.017 -0.008 -0.016 0.022 0.018 -0.0036*** -0.002*
(0.08) (-0.64) (-0.62) (-0.71) (0.75) (0.11) (-3.10) (-1.78)
Net Fixed Assets (%) 0.61*** 0.45*** 0.568*** 0.58*** 0.031 -0.12*** 0.02*** 0.014***
(6.38) (10.88) (5.69) (16.85) (0.89) (-4.77) (6.23) (7.23)
Net Sales (%) 0.016*** 0.018*** -0.0008 -0.002 0.015*** 0.021*** -0.0007*** -0.0006**
(2.47) (4.12) (-0.51) (-0.69) (2.52) (7.47) (-3.58) (-3.01)
Size 0.14*** 0.037 -0.017 -0.36*** 0.059*** 0.07 0.026*** -0.006
(5.87) (0.39) (-0.176) (-4.3) (5.31) (1.21) (12.05) (-1.36)
Profitability -0.08 -0.18*** -0.035** -0.052 -0.045 -0.13*** -0.00006 0.0023
(-1.31) (-3.91) (-2.23) (-1.34) (-0.78) (-4.36) (-0.02) (1.08)
Volatility of Earnings -0.002 -0.005 -0.001 -0.005 -0.001 -0.0006 0.0003 -0.0013***
(-0.94) (-0.91) (-0.70) (-1.25) (-0.79) (-0.18) (0.80) (-5.17)
Macroeconomic  Factors :
Cost of Equity 0.88 0.34 0.94** 0.39 0.11 -0.008 -0.057*** 0.004
(1.42) (0.52) (1.97) (0.74) (0.42) (-0.02) (-2.67) (0.14)
Inflation -0.025* 0.004 -0.029** 0.007 -0.007 -0.0079 -0.006*** -0.0029**
(-1.71) (0.16) (-1.98) (0.33) (-1.21) (-0.47) (-4.49) (-2.33)
Real Lending Interest Rate  -0.049** 0.046* 0.013 0.027 -0.051*** 0.023 0.0027** -0.001
(Short-Term) (-2.26) (1.79) (0.76) (1.27) (-3.82) (1.49) (2.0) (-0.92)
Volatility of Inflation 0.037*** 0.009 0.002* 0.0001 0.017*** 0.01 -0.006 -0.0006
(2.64) (0.17) (1.82) (0.004) (2.81) (0.30) (-1.34) (-0.25)
Log (GDP/Capita) -0.226*** -0.50 0.15** 0.048 -0.32*** -0.17 0.09*** -0.016
(-2.61) (-1.44) (2.08) (0.16) (-5.14) (-0.79) (10.51) (-1.01)
Financial System Development :
Credit to Private Sector  0.006*** 0.012*** 0.003*** 0.0076** 0.0038*** 0.004 -0.0009*** -0.00033*
(4.49) (2.78) (2.44) (2.13) (5.31) (1.58) (-11.55) (-1.66)
Stock Market Capitalization -0.008*** -0.00017 -0.0044*** -0.002** -0.0037*** -0.0002** 0.0004*** 0.00019*
(-6.59) (0.08) (-5.65) (-0.13) (-6.33) (-0.19) (5.29) (1.89)
Stock Market Liquidity -0.52** 0.008 -0.03 0.009 -0.29** 0.0026 0.02** 0.0017*
(Turnover Ratio) (-2.92) (0.44) (-0.17) (0.61) (-2.39) (0.21) (1.96) (1.88)
Contractual Savings Development 0.065 2.09*** 0.18 1.27* -0.14* 0.76 0.046*** 0.018
( financial assets, % CAP. MKT.) (0.32) (2.39) (1.28) (1.74) (-1.80) (1.42) (3.51) (0.44)
Dummy Variables :
Sector - country ( 2 digit SIC code)  . Yes . Yes . Yes . Yes
Book Reserve System 1.19*** . 0.34 . 0.96*** . -0.086*** .
(4.88) (1.43) (4.95) (-6.87)
Centrally Managed Pension Funds -0.16 . 0.036 . -0.028 . -0.16*** .
(-1.24) (0.46) (-0.56) (-8.36)
Adjusted R-squared 0.099 0.017 0.05 0.024 0.087 0.011 0.18 0.01
Nb of Observations 5867 5867 5867 5867 6728 5867 5729 5810
Nb of Cross-Section Units . 943 . 1046 . 943 . 936
Fixed Effects . 2.46*** . 4.06*** . 2.01*** . 11.3*** 
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Dependent Variables : Total Debt/Equity Long-Term Debt/Equity Short-Term Debt/Equity Long-Term Debt/ Total Debt
Pooled Within Pooled Within Pooled Within Pooled Within
Explanatory Variables :
Firms' Characteristics :
Growth opportunities -0.02 -0.047 -0.0058 -0.0118 0.001 -0.023 -0.002** -0.003**
(-0.56) (-1.48) (-0.32) (-0.43) (0.05) (-1.31) (-1.92) (-1.94)
Net Fixed Assets (%) 0.60*** 0.43*** 0.56*** 0.58*** 0.026 -0.13*** 0.019*** 0.0138***
(5.58) (10.17) (4.71) (15.08) (0.74) (-5.34) (5.32) (6.24)
Net Sales (%) 0.018*** 0.021*** 0.00001 -0.002 0.016*** 0.022*** -0.0008*** -0.0005***
(2.68) (4.81) (0.008) (-0.54) (2.57) (8.50) (-3.77) (-2.45)
Size 0.09*** 0.14 -0.035 -0.27*** 0.034*** 0.09* 0.027*** 0.004
(4.17) (1.57) (-0.35) (-3.42) (3.48) (1.76) (12.56) (0.98)
Profitability -0.077 -0.18*** -0.036*** -0.049 -0.043 -0.13*** -0.00004 0.0029
(-1.26) (-3.98) (-2.77) (-1.21) (-0.75) (-4.81) (-0.017) (1.24)
Volatility of Earnings -0.007 -0.006 0.006 0.0068 -0.017 -0.0059 0.0009 0.004
(-0.28) (-0.09) (0.75) (0.11) (-0.69) (-0.15) (0.75) (1.24)
Macroeconomic  Factors :
Cost of Equity 0.82 -0.22 0.80* -0.017 0.17 -0.10 -0.014 -0.039**
(1.36) (-0.55) (1.75) (-0.051) (0.66) (-0.44) (-0.65) (-1.94)
Inflation -0.03** -0.015 -0.022*** -0.0017 -0.013*** -0.012 -0.002** -0.001
(-3.42) (-0.92) (-2.79) (-0.11) (-3.44) (-1.26) (-2.09) (-1.23)
Real Lending Interest Rate  -0.046*** 0.02 -0.006 0.018 -0.034*** 0.012 -0.002* -0.002**
(Short-Term) (-3.14) (1.20) (-0.63) (0.97) (-3.33) (1.04) (-1.88) (-1.92)
Volatility of Inflation 0.022 -0.005 0.014 -0.003 0.007 -0.00046 -0.0068 -0.014
(1.66) (-0.10) (1.35) (-0.06) (1.31) (-0.015) (-1.45) (-0.507)
Log (GDP/Capita) -0.19* -0.44 0.046 0.17 -0.19*** -0.21 0.065*** 0.014
(-1.73) (-1.25) (0.45) (0.50) (-4.41) (-0.99) (10.1) (0.76)
Financial System Development :
Credit to Private Sector  0.006** 0.01*** 0.007*** 0.017* -0.0002 0.0037 8.08E-06 -0.0006***
(2.37) (2.62) (3.29) (0.97) (-0.23) (1.63) (0.065) (-3.22)
Stock Market Capitalization -0.007*** -0.009 -0.004*** -0.0017 -0.0028*** 0.0001 0.0003*** -0.00004
(-4.97) (-0.53) (-3.35) (-1.14) (-5.62) (0.11) (3.06) (0.46)
Stock Market Liquidity -0.24 0.0079 -0.014 0.0089 -0.07 0.002 0.005 0.00037
(Turnover Ratio) (-1.09) (0.52) (-0.07) (0.66) (-0.54) (0.29) (0.58) (0.48)
Contractual Savings Portfolio  -0.92*** -3.12*** -0.96*** -1.08 -0.117 -1.78*** -0.13*** 0.047
(-3.48) (-2.51) (-4.13) (-0.97) (-1.03) (-2.41) (-6.03) (0.74)
Dummy Variables :
Sector - country ( 2 digit SIC code) . Yes . Yes . Yes . Yes
Book Reserve System 0.89*** . 0.02 . 1.05*** . -0.16*** .
(3.21) (0.08) (5.01) (-12.41)
Centrally Managed Pension Funds -0.43*** . -0.51*** . -0.07 . -0.258*** .
(-3.77) (-3.05) (-1.37) (-12.38)
Adjusted R-squared 0.1 0.036 0.048 0.028 0.1 0.024 0.19 0.042
Nb of Observations 5501 5501 5501 5501 5501 5501 5438 5438
Nb of Cross-Section Units . 904 . 904 . 904 . 897
Fixed Effects . 2.66*** . 4.17*** . 2.13*** . 10.52*** 
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Figure 9: Leverage (TDTE) and Contractual Savings Development 
(Financial Assets, % Securities Market)  
- Conditional Correlation - 
 
 



















Regression line: Residual = -1.16 * (CS Financial Assets, % Sec. Market) (t-stat = -2.47) 





Values are the unexplained residuals of leverage (TDTE) plotted against Contractual 
Savings Financial Assets (% Sec. Market) for countries with Market-based financial 
systems. The control variables are : 
(1) Firms’ Characteristics, 
(2) Macroeconomic Factors, 
(3) Financial System Development Variables, 
(4) Book reserve  system and Centrally Managed Pension Funds dummies. 


























































Regression line: Residual = 4.0 * (CS Financial Assets, % Sec. Market) (t-stat = 2.37) 





Values are the unexplained residuals of leverage (TDTE) plotted against Contractual 
Savings Financial Assets (% Sec. Market) for countries w ith Bank-based financial 
systems. The control variables are : 
(1) Firms’ Characteristics, 
(2) Macroeconomic Factors, 
(3) Financial System Development Variables, 
(4) Book reserve  system and Centrally Managed Pension Funds dummies. 
















































Figure 10: Leverage (TDTE) and Contractual Savings Portfolio 
(Shares, % Financial Assets) 
 - Conditional Correlation - 
 
 



















Regression line: Residual = - 1.11 * (CS Shares, % Financial Assets) (t-stat = -2.46) 





Values are the unexplained residuals of leverage (TDTE) plotted against Contractual 
Savings Share Holdings (% Financial Assets) for countries with Market-based financial 
systems. The control variables are : 
(1) Firms’ Characteristics, 
(2) Macroeconomic Factors, 
(3) Financial System Development Variables, 
(4) Book reserve  system and Centrally Managed Pension Funds dummies. 






























































Regression line: Residual = 1.77 * (CS Shares, % Financial Assets) (t-stat = 1.09) 





Values are the unexplained residuals of leverage (TDTE) plotted against Contractual 
Savings Share Holdings (% Financial Assets) for countries with Bank-based financial 
systems. The control variables are : 
(1) Firms’ Characteristics, 
(2) Macroeconomic Factors, 
(3) Financial System Development Variables, 
(4) Book reserve  system and Centrally Managed Pension Funds dummies. 













































Figure 11: Debt Maturity and Contractual Savings Development 
 (Financial Assets, % Securities Market)  
 - Conditional Correlation - 
 




















Regression line: Residual = -0.09 * (CS Financial Assets, % Sec Mkt) (t-stat = -3.84) 





Values are the unexplained residuals of debt  maturity (LTDTD) plotted against 
Contractual Savings Financial Assets (% Securities Market Size) for countries with 
Market-based financial systems. The control variables are : 
(1) Firms’ Characteristics, 
(2) Macroeconomic Factors, 
(3) Financial System Development Variables, 
(4) Book reserve  system and Centrally Managed Pension Funds dummies. 














































Regression line: Residual = 0.28 * (CS Financial Assets, % Sec Mkt) (t-stat = 5.28) 





Values are the unexplained residuals of debt maturity (LTDTD) plotted against 
Contractual Savings Financial Assets (% Securities Market Size) for countries with 
Bank-based financial systems. The control variables are : 
(1) Firms’ Characteristics, 
(2) Macroeconomic Factors, 
(3) Financial System Development Variables , 
(4) Book reserve  system and Centrally Managed Pension Funds dummies. 







































Table 7: Market-Based and Bank-Based Financial Systems  
Contractual Savings and Firms’ Financing Choices 
 
Pooled and Panel Estimates
Summary of the Results
Market-based Financial Systems
Total Debt/Equity LT Debt/Equity ST Debt/Equity Long-Term Debt/ Total Debt
OLS Within OLS Within OLS Within OLS Within
Contractual Savings Development -0.55*** 0.007 -0.37*** 0.053 -0.15* 0.003 -0.08*** 0.01
( financial assets, % GDP) (-3.69) (0.017) (-3.93) (0.19) (-1.72) (0.014) (-6.24) (0.6)
Contractual Savings Development -0.28 -0.01 -0.30*** 0.4 0.042 -0.38 -0.17*** 0.019
(financial assets, % Capital Market) (-1.39) (-0.013) (-2.81) (1.013) (0.31) (-0.73) (-9.37) (0.36)
Contractual Savings Development -0.64*** 0.23 -0.44*** 0.45 -0.18 -0.14 -0.15*** -0.02
(shares, % Stock Market Cap.) (-2.84) (0.34) (-3.18) (1.14) (-1.37) (-0.34) (-7.9) (-0.48)
Contractual Savings Portfolio -0.96*** -4.06*** -0.64*** -1.93*** -0.33** -2.01*** -0.10*** 0.01
(Shares, % financial assets) (-3.46) (-3.69) (-3.65) (-3.007) (-1.97) (-2.87) (-4.10) (0.16)
Bank Based Financial Systems
Total Debt/Equity LT Debt/Equity ST Debt/Equity Long-Term Debt/ Total Debt
OLS Within OLS Within OLS Within OLS Within
Contractual Savings Development 3.66*** 8.4*** 2.78** 3.19 0.69 3.74*** 0.217*** 0.05
( financial assets, % GDP) (3.42) (3.85) (2.49) (1.59) (1.14) (2.89) (3.83) (0.68)
Contractual Savings Development 3.3*** 8.92*** 2.85*** 4.41** 0.21 3.16** 0.41*** 0.14**
(financial assets, % Capital Market) (4.26) (4.25) (3.53) (2.29) (0.49) (2.55) (10.28) (1.92)
Contractual Savings Development 1.88*** 4.41** 1.12 2.95 0.49 0.42 0.04 0.068
(shares, % Stock Market Cap.) (2.47) (2.09) (1.25) (1.4) (1.19) (0.35) (1.19) (0.95)
Contractual Savings Portfolio 2.27 -6.9 0.79 -2.51 0.98 -3.55 -0.013 0.84***
(Shares, % financial assets) (1.11) (-1.11) (0.32) (-0.38) (0.88) (-1.009) (-0.13) (3.84)
We report (1) the coefficient, (2) t-statistic.
Control Variables include:
(1) Firm Characteristics (2) Macroeconomic Factors (3) Financial System Characteristics